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The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires Government agencies to use a 
structured approach to determine prenegotiation profit objectives for those contracts 
requiring cost analysis. The structured approach utilized by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) is the Weighted Guidelines. This research sought to examine the 
effectiveness of the current Weighted Guidelines, as a vehicle for implementation of 
DoD profit policy, from the perspective of the defense industry. Industry opinions 
were solicited on a range of issues through use of a survey instrument. These issues 
included industry familiarity with the Weighted Guidelines, use of the Weighted 
Guidelines by industry to prepare for negotiations with the Government, value of 
profit policy and the Weighted Guidelines as incentives for firms to remain in the 
defense industrial base, and overall opinion of the Weighted Guidelines method. 
Respondent opinions were analyzed in detail, and conclusions and recommendations 
for improvement were presented. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Over the last thirty-five years, several studies have 
been conducted to review the manner in which the Federal 
Government determines profit levels for defense contractors. 
Defense industry profitability is of great interest to 
Congress, the media, and the tax-paying public. Concerns over 
"profiteering" by defense manufacturers are nothing new, 
dating back to the Revolutionary War period. Yet, it is 
obviously in the Government's best interest to ensure that 
defense contractors are properly compensated for effective 
performance. These financial rewards are greatly influenced 
by profit policy. The current policy in use by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) was implemented on 01 August 1987. 
The policy is set forth in the DoD Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Part 215, Subpart 215.9. In 
accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the 
DFARS provides a structured approach for determining profit or 
fee objectives in acquisitions requiring cost analysis. This 
approach is known as the Weighted Guidelines (WGL) . The goal 
of this policy is to: 
incentivize  contractors  to  reduce  costs  by 
investing in capital-reducing equipment; 
reward contractors for taking on risk; 
motivate contractors  to perform in the most 
efficient manner. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the 
effectiveness of DoD's profit policy, specifically the 
Weighted Guidelines method of establishing profit objective, 
in incentivizing defense contractors to provide efficient and 
effective contract performance. This analysis is based on 
interviews with the defense industry. As Lester C. Thurow has 
noted, "the highest profits are to be found in producing the 
goods and services that potential buyers want most." 
[Ref 13:p.64] This study will examine the connection between 
profit and performance by examining the perspective of the 
defense firms themselves. Do defense contractors feel they 
are being properly rewarded for producing the goods and 
services DoD wants? 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The focus of the research will be limited to the 
effectiveness of the Weighted Guidelines in stimulating 
efficient and effective performance, as seen from the 
perspective of defense contractors and subcontractors.  The 
research is intended to evaluate current policy, focusing on 
industry opinion. 
This research does not address actual profit levels 
experienced by the defense industry. The researcher made no 
attempt to conduct a statistical analysis of profit trends. 
D.   RESEARCH QUESTION 
To achieve the stated objectives, the following primary 
research question is presented: To what extent does DoD's 
current profit policy, specifically the Weighted Guidelines 
method of determining profit objective, incentivize defense 
contractors to provide the most efficient and effective 
contract performance? 
In support of the primary question, the following 
subsidiary questions were developed to help analyze the 
effectiveness of DoD's profit policy: 
• How does the defense industry view the 
effectiveness of DoD's profit policy? 
• Do defense contractors use the Weighted 
Guidelines method to prepare for negotiations? 
If not, why not? 
• In an era of declining defense budgets, to what 
extent does DoD's profit policy provide an 
incentive to contractors to remain an active 
member of the defense industrial base? 
E.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of the research consisted of two 
components: development of a literature base and interviews of 
defense contractors. The literature base was developed 
primarily with materials obtained via the Defense Logistics 
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the Dudley-Knox 
Library at the Naval Postgraduate School. Additionally, 
various journals and periodicals concerning Government 
acquisition were consulted. 
This research was conducted to determine how members of 
the defense industry view DoD's profit policy, specifically 
the Weighted Guidelines. Questionnaires were sent to the 
Director of Government Contracts at 100 defense firms. The 
contractors were selected through use of Hoover's Handbook of 
American Business, Fortune magazine, and the 1994 Partners in 
Preparedness Directory in the May/June 1994 issue of National 
Defense magazine. The researcher targeted those firms known 
to have conducted business with DoD. Of the 100 surveys 
mailed, 48 were returned for a response rate of 48%. The 
questionnaire contained 27 yes-no, scaled, and open-ended 
questions. The questions were designed to elicit opinions on 
a wide range of issues related to industry's perception of, 
and experience with, DoD profit policy and the Weighted 
Guidelines.  Average time to complete the questionnaire was 
estimated at 10 to 15 minutes. Respondents were given the 
option of remaining anonymous, although they were encouraged 
to provide their names and phone numbers for follow-on 
questioning as necessary. In addition to questions concerning 
DoD's profit policy, respondents were asked questions 
regarding size of company, number of employees, amount of 
annual business with DoD, and the type of product or service 
provided. 
F.   ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study consists of six chapters. Chapter I contains 
an introduction to the scope, purpose and methodology of the 
research. The research questions, scope and limitations made 
in the research are described, with a brief literature review 
and the research methodology outlined to end the chapter. 
Chapter II provides a discussion of the theoretical structure 
of the research, including a review of the role of profit as 
an incentive and the evolution of Government profit policy. 
Chapter III contains the background and history of DoD's 
Weighted Guidelines method of establishing profit objective, 
and includes a detailed discussion of the current policy. 
Chapter IV contains the results of the research 
questionnaires. Included in Chapter IV are the responses to 
each question, with a presentation of the results and their 
numerical distribution. Chapter V provides an analysis of the 
results described in Chapter IV, as well as general 
observations made by the researcher in the course of the 
study. 
Chapter VI provides conclusions formulated from the 
research of DoD's profit policy and provides recommendations 
for improvement. Additionally, all research questions are 
summarized and areas for further study are identified. 
II.      THEORETICAL   STRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Government, when procuring goods and 
services, strives to purchase the highest quality items 
necessary to satisfy its requirements while paying the lowest 
possible price. In order for this process to occur, there 
must be commercial firms and manufacturers willing to deal 
with the Government. The Government, therefore, must provide 
an incentive.  That incentive is profit. [Ref 13:p.64] 
This chapter will present the theoretical structure that 
was used to conduct the research and analysis. It is designed 
to present the reader with a thorough understanding of the 
goals and evolution of current profit policy. The first 
section will provide a general overview of Government profit 
theory. Subsequent sections will discuss the role of profit 
as a motivator; the evolution of profit policy; and the 
various studies which have contributed to the development of 
the current policy. Familiarity with these topics will 
enhance the reader's understanding of the current environment. 
B. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Traditionally, the Government has relied on the forces of 
the marketplace to establish contract prices. [Ref 16:p.4-l] 
It is assumed that if a price is set by competition, it will 
by definition be fair and reasonable. The amount of profit 
achieved by the contractor depends on his ability to produce 
below the contract price. In these situations, cost- analysis 
by the Government is not required. [Ref 16:p.4-l] 
Under circumstances where competitive forces are absent, 
cost analysis is a must. As a part of this process, 
contractor profit is reviewed. The contracting officer must 
determine a fair and equitable profit level for the 
contractor, based on the circumstances of the individual 
contract. This is a critical step, due to the Government 
emphasis on profit as a contractor incentive: 
It is the Government's belief that profit is the 
basic motivating force behind the contractor. 
There is an implied assumption on the part of the 
Government that the contractor will be properly 
motivated if given the opportunity to increase his 
profits. [Ref 22:p.47] 
C.   PROFIT AS A MOTIVATIONAL FORCE 
Profit can be viewed from several perspectives. The 
accountant views profit in terms of numbers; profit (or net 
income) is simply calculated by deducting total expenses from 
total revenue. [Ref 12:p.l6]  In other words, "when a business 
firm has paid all of its costs, what is left over is profit." 
[Ref 7:p.298] 
From an economist's perspective, manufacturers earn a 
return on their efforts by providing three productive inputs: 
First, they are willing to delay their own personal 
gratification....They save some of today's income 
and invest those savings in activities that will 
yield goods and services in the future. When sold, 
these future goods and services will yield profits 
that can then be used to finance consumption or 
additional investment....Second, some profits are a 
return to those who take risks. Some investments 
make a profit and return what was invested plus a 
profit, but others don't....On average, those who 
take risks will earn a higher rate of return on 
their investments than those who invest more 
conservatively....Third, some profits are a return 
to organizational ability, enterprise, and 
entrepreneurial energy. The entrepreneur, by 
inventing a new product or process, or by 
organizing the better delivery of an old product, 
generates profits. [Ref 13:p.64] 
As discussed above, the Government sees profit as the 
prime motivator for contractors. Is this the case? As Gerald 
T. Nielsen has indicated, "most business oriented decision 
makers today have been so ingrained with the principles of 
profit maximization that the concept seems almost intuitively 
obvious." [Ref ll:p.22] Additionally, Dr. Peter Drucker 
notes: 
...production for profit is the principle of 
rationality and efficiency on which the corporation 
must  base  itself...and  the  demand  that  some 
criterion other than profitability be used as a 
determinant  of  economic  actions  rests  on  a 
misunderstanding of the economic process. 
[Ref 5:pp.231-232] 
The view of the defense industry toward profit is also 
reflected by the remarks of Roy A. Anderson of the Aerospace 
Industries Association, made before the House Armed Services 
Committee in 1988: 
Reasonable profits, not excessive profits, are good 
for the defense industry and our nation. 
Reasonable profits invite competition, broaden the 
industrial base, provide stimulus for investment in 
research and development and attracting and 
retaining technical personnel so essential to 
maintaining this- nation's technology leadership. 
Profits are necessary for investment in capital 
equipment to increase productivity and reduce 
costs, and serve as the base for investment and 
financing.  [Ref 2:p.35] 
It makes sense that, in a capitalistic society, 
contractors are driven by profit. However, there are other 
factors to consider as well. These include the firm's 
strengths and weaknesses, the competitive environment, the 
health of the industrial base and the goals of the firm: 
Contractors do not necessarily seek maximum profit 
on every contract. There do exist other 
motivational forces, such as concerns for follow-on 
business, growth opportunities, or improvement of 
corporate image. [Ref 15:p.l95] 
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A study by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) in the 
late 1960s made several interesting points about the role of 
profit in the defense industry [Ref 9:p.8]: 
There is virtually unanimous agreement among 
managers and analysts who have studied overall 
contractor motivation that, in the short run, 
contractor management does sacrifice short run 
profit on defense business'in favor of achieving: 
1. Company growth; 
2. Increased industry market share; 
3. A better public image; 
4. Organizational prestige; 
5. Benefits to commercial business; 
6. Greater opportunity for follow-on business; 
7. Shareholder expectations. 
In summary, the LMI study concluded that management 
...does not attempt to maximize profit or fee on 
individual contracts. It attempts to optimize 
among many objectives, placing particular stress on 
those which contribute most to maintaining or 
improving market position and assuring the future 
strength of the firm.  [Ref 9:p.9] 
It seems clear that many factors motivate contractor 
performance and influence management decisions. However it 
seems equally clear that without adequate profits firms will 
11 
not long survive, particularly in an era of reduced defense 
spending. In the long run, the profit motive must be 
satisfied before contractors focus on other concerns. 
D.   EVOLUTION OF PROFIT POLICY 
In the early part of our nation's history, the focus on 
price competition prevented the need for a formal profit 
policy. However, defense procurement was not without its 
problems. "Allegations of excessive profits can be traced 
back to the Revolutionary War." [Ref 14:p.915] By 1809, 
Government statutes required purchasing officers to advertise 
for competitive bids for the procurement of defense goods. 
[Ref 10:p.6] During the Civil War, the Civil Sundry 
Appropriations Act of 1861 formalized bidding procedures but 
made allowance for negotiated procurement. This Act remained 
the basic procurement statute for nearly 100 years. 
During World War I, war profiteering again became a 
concern. During this period, many unique military items were 
bought using cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts. This 
approach to contracting resulted in such abuses that "during 
the period between the wars, Congress considered 200 bills and 
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resolutions aimed at controlling war profits and improving the 
purchasing system." [Ref 3:p.28] 
The attention to war profiteering eventually led to the 
enactment of the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934. The Vinson- 
Trammel Act 
...limited profits on military aircraft prime and 
subcontracts to 12% of the price, and on naval 
prime and subcontracts to 10% of the price. The 
latter limitation was also included in the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936.  [Ref 14:p.915] 
In 1939, the Vinson-Trammel Act was amended to raise the 
profit rate on naval contracts to 12%. 
In the early days of World War II, Congress responded to 
the national crisis by passing the First War Powers Act of 
1941.  This Act 
...gave the president the authority to empower 
federal agencies to enter into contracts without 
regard to existing legislation if they facilitated 
the war effort. Additional actions by the 
president and the War Production Board would 
authorize negotiated contracts in lieu of complying 
with formal advertising statutes, and finally 
prohibit formal advertising totally.  [Ref 10:p.8] 
With the massive mobilization of national industry during 
the war, the prospect of profiteering again became an issue. 
The Renegotiation Act of 1942 called for the renegotiation of 
both prime and subcontracts in excess of $100,000 and made 
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possible the recovery of excess profits. [Ref 22:p.50] Under 
this Act, the Government was authorized to redetermine a fair 
and reasonable profit on a contract-by-contract basis after 
delivery of the products. Determination of reasonable and 
excessive profits in defense awards was based on such factors 
as contribution to the war effort, efficiency, and extent of 
risk assumed. [Ref 14:p.915] The Renegotiation Act was 
modified in 1951, transferring administration of this 
statutory profit limitation to an independent Renegotiation 
Board. The final Renegotiation Act of 1951 was extended 13 
times and lasted until September 30, 1976. [Ref 14:p.915] 
After World War II, the Armed Services Procurement Act 
(ASPA) of 1947 supplanted the Civil Sundry Appropriations Act 
of 1861 as the principal statute governing defense 
procurement. The Department of Defense (DoD) implemented the 
ASPA through the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR), 
which provided DoD's first formalized policy statement on 
profit: 
The Department of Defense must apply contracting 
policies and methods designed to create an 
environment in which industry can realize profits 
on defense business which are high enough to give 
reasonable assurance of long term availability to 
DoD of industrial support by the best companies and 
to enable those defense contractors to attract 
sufficient equity and borrowed capital. [Ref 
22:p.51] 
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The ASPR lacked specific guidance for the contracting 
officer to use in developing profit objectives for negotiated 
contracts. Eventually, over the course of the decade of the 
1950s, nine profit elements were identified: 
Effective competition; 
Degree of risk; 
Nature of work to be performed; 
Extent of Government assistance; 
Extent of contractor investment; 




Lacking specific guidance, contracting personnel were forced 
to subjectively evaluate each element and the weight to be 
accorded. The predominant factor was the "historical rate" 
established on previous contracts. "Contracting officers used 
the above nine profit elements only to adjust profit rates to 
fit specific procurement situations." [Ref 22:p.52] 
Inadequacies in this policy led to continued Congressional and 
public concerns over excessive defense profits. Clearly, a 
new approach was needed. 
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E.    THE LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE STUDY 
In an effort to develop a more structured approach to 
determination of prenegotiation profit objectives, in 1963 DoD 
commissioned the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to 
conduct a detailed study of profit policy- and recommend 
improvements.  The objective of this study was 
...to develop a rational, workable, uniform and 
equitable approach to target profits which will 
result in a wider range of profits. The study aims 
to develop specific guidelines to assist 
contracting personnel in arriving at appropriate 
profit ratios to further national and departmental 
interests utilizing the profit motive of DoD 
contractors. [Ref 3:p.31] 
Essentially, the LMI study found that [Ref 3:pp.31-32]: 
Government contracting personnel were using the 
profit or fee rate established under previous 
contracts as a price determinant for negotiation 
of new contracts; 
contractor investment was not being used to 
determine fee or profit; 
contractor investment was often a criterion used 
in the source selection process, but was not used 
in negotiations. 
Based on the conclusions of the LMI study, DoD 
implemented the original Weighted Guidelines (WGL) on 01 
January 1964.  The WGL was a more structured approach designed 
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to allow contracting personnel to develop profit objectives 
consistent with the circumstances of each contract. The new 
approach was based on the concept that profit 
...should depend on the risk assumed by the 
contractor, the difficulty of the task, the amount 
of contract cost, the source of resources, 
contractor past performance and other factors [Ref 
18:p.V-l] 
Under this approach, the contracting officer "would select a 
specific profit rate from a range provided by the guidelines." 
[Ref 21:App.I, p.6] The new policy, while more structured, 
still depended heavily on the subjective determination of 
contracting personnel. The WGL were also criticized for 
failing to properly recognize contractor investment, and 
depending too heavily on estimated cost as a basis for 
determining profit objectives. 
DoD continued to be interested in promoting contractor 
investment. In order to determine the effects of the new WGL 
approach, DoD in 1967 again commissioned LMI to perform a 
study of its profit policy. LMI determined that the WGL had 
in fact provided contractors a negative incentive to invest in 
new facilities and equipment.  The study concluded that 
...the Weighted Guidelines provided incentives for 
the contractor not to invest in cost reducing plant 
and equipment but to allow costs to escalate... .LMI 
recommended  that  the  weighted  guidelines  be 
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expanded to allow profit objectives to be 
determined by costs and assets applied. The 
proposed solution went on to state that the assets 
to use in determining profit should be operating 
and facilities capital.  [Ref 3:p.35] 
As a further analysis of the results and impact of the 
Weighted Guidelines, a RAND Corporation study in 1969 
concluded that [Ref 15:pp.256-257]: 
Most firms had higher target fee rates after 
introduction of the Weighted Guidelines approach, 
but average realized fee rates appear to have 
remained about the same. 
The Weighted Guidelines method resulted in 
spreading the distribution of going-in target fee 
rates. 
The objective was achieved, if the goal of the 
method was to increase profit opportunities, 
regardless of whether or not they were achieved, 
by providing higher levels of target fees. 
The goal was achieved, if the goal was to provide 
a wider distribution of average fees. 
The goal was not achieved, if the goal was to 
increase actual fees rather than target fees. 
Results appear to have been mixed and on the 
whole unsuccessful, if the goal was to raise the 
profitability of defense investment. 
Further studies indicated that the Weighted Guidelines 
were not providing contractors with incentives to invest in 
cost-reducing equipment. This was primarily due to the WGL 
approach of  linking profits  to  costs.   A 1971  General 
Accounting Office (GAO) study noted that, "under the current 
system of negotiating contract prices, such investments tend 
to lower, rather than increase, profits in the long run." [Ref 
3:p.36] 
In an attempt to remedy the problem of contractor 
investment, DoD developed a policy on contractor capital 
employed in 1972. This new policy was published in Defense 
Procurement Circular (DPC) 107, which established a method to 
base profit on return on investment. It provided that "50% of 
the profit would be based on the contractor's facilities and 
operating capital investment." [Ref 4:p.8] DPC 107 was 
optional, based on agreement between the Government and the 
contractor. The policy was largely unsuccessful; little used 
and apparently too complex, DPC 107 was phased out in 1975. 
F.   PROFIT '76 
In view of continued criticism of its profit policy and 
the Weighted Guidelines, DoD launched a massive study of 
defense industry profitability and the health of the defense 
industrial base. This study became known as Profit '76. The 
purpose of the study was twofold [Ref 19:p.I-2]: 
to determine defense contractors' profit on both 
defense and non-defense business. 
19 
to examine the relation of earnings to capital 
investment in assets designed to increase 
productivity and lower costs. 
Cost and investment data from companies holding defense 
contracts valued at over $16 billion were gathered for the 
study. In addition, surveys were conducted of Government 
procurement personnel, industry representatives and financial 
institutions. The study focused on those DoD policies which 
"govern or impact the profitability, capital investment 
policies, and overall financial condition of defense 
contractors." [Ref 19:p.I-4] 
Profit '76 concluded that DoD's profit policy suffered 
from two primary problems [Ref 19:p.i]: 
• overemphasis  in the  Weighted  Guidelines  on 
estimated cost as a profit factor. 
• the  absence  of contractor  investment  as  a 
meaningful profit determinant. 
Based on the results of Profit '76, DoD revised its profit 
policy, which was released as Defense Procurement Circular 
(DPC) 76-3, effective 01 October 1976.   Several important 
changes were included [Ref 19:pp.VII-6,7]: 
The imputed cost of capital for facility 
investment (cost of money measured in accordance 
with Cost Accounting Standard 414) would be 
considered allowable on most negotiated DoD 
contracts. 
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• The level of facility investment would be 
recognized by DoD contracting officers in 
reaching a pre-negotiation profit objective under 
the Weighted Guidelines method. 
• Contract estimated cost received less emphasis as 
a profit determinant. 
• A greater spread in profit was established to 
recognize the difference in risk between cost- 
reimbursement and fixed-price type contracts. 
• Productivity improvements were introduced as a 
modest profit factor so as to further the 
principle that reduced costs will lead to 
increased earnings. 
• Past performance as a profit determinant was 
deleted from the Weighted Guidelines. 
With the new policy, DoD sought to maintain the viability 
of the defense industrial base by ensuring defense contractors 
the opportunity to earn adequate profits on defense contracts, 
as well as providing a positive incentive to invest in cost- 
reducing, increased efficiency facilities. 
G.   1979 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STUDY 
In March of 1979, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
released the results of a study assessing the effectiveness of 
the first 18 months of DPC 76-3. This study concluded that 
[Ref 20:p.5-9]: 
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There was little indication that DoD's objective 
of encouraging contractors to invest in new or 
upgraded plant and equipment in order to lower 
production costs was being achieved. 
Prenegotiation profit objectives were still based 
primarily on cost rather than facilities 
investment. 
There were indications the new policy had 
resulted in the negotiation of higher profit 
rates on an overall basis. 
As a result of GAO's findings, DoD again revised its 
policy. The new guidance was published in 1980 as Defense 
Acquisition Circular (DAC) 76-23, and contained two major 
changes [Ref 14:p.919; Ref 8:p.56]: 
Profit for facilities capital investment was 
increased from a 6-10% range to a 16-20% range, 
increasing this factor's percentage of total 
profit from 10% to 17%. 
The Weighted Guidelines were modified to provide 
separate profit weight ranges for manufacturing, 
research and development, and service contracts. 
In the continuing effort to evaluate DoD's policy, the 
Air Force Systems Command conducted yet another study, Profit 
'82. [Ref 4:pp.l3-14] This study was designed to assess the 
relevance of the current policy and the success of the changes 
made under DPC 76-3 and DAC 76-23. In summary, Profit '82 
found that despite the changes discussed above, DoD profit 
policy was still not rewarding contractor capital investment, 
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nor was it providing motivation to invest. According to the 
Air Force research, during the period 1977-1981, capital 
investment on defense contracts as a percentage of total 
contract costs did not change. Additionally, the study found 
that DoD's policy lacked credibility within. industry. [Ref 
4:pp.13-14] 
H.   DEFENSE FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT REVIEW 
In 1983 DoD commissioned another massive study, the 
Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR). The goal of 
DFAIR was to recommend "changes to contract pricing, financing 
and profit policies." [Ref 14:p.919] This study was conducted 
with the cooperation of selected Government officials, 
professional and industry associations, the Logistics 
Management Institute, and accounting firms. 
Released in August 1985, DFAIR concluded that 
...in general, the current contract pricing, 
financing and markup (profit) policies are (1) 
balanced economically, (2) protecting the interests 
of the taxpayer, and (3) enabling U.S. industry to 
achieve an equitable return for its involvement in 
defense business. [Ref 21:p.9] 
Additionally, DoD concluded from the DFAIR study that its 
profit policy had resulted in a . 5 to 1 percent unintended 
increase in profit objectives.  Among DFAIR's recommendations 
23 
were the cancellation of DAC 76-23, upon which the increased 
profits were blamed, and revision of the Weighted Guidelines 
such that average profits would be reduced by .5 to 1 percent. 
Based on these conclusions and recommendations, DoD issued a 
revised, interim profit policy on September 18, 1986. 
Congress mandated adoption of the new policy under P.L. 99- 
500, enacted October 18, 1986; DoD was directed to make 
certain additional changes before issuing its final rule. 
This final rule, a complete revision of Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Subpart 215.9, was 
issued on August 3, 1987, effective August 1, 1987. [Ref 
14:pp.916-920] 
I.   SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an 
understanding of the Federal Government's traditional position 
on profit, an examination of the role of profit as a motivator 
for the private sector, and a brief review of the evolution of 
DoD profit policy. The next chapter will discuss the current 
policy, specifically the Weighted Guidelines, in detail. 
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III.  BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the current DoD policy, specifically the 
Weighted Guidelines, will be described in detail. Included is 
a review of the factors to be considered by the contracting 
officer when developing profit objectives. The chapter will 
close with a sample calculation of a profit objective in order 
to demonstrate use of the Weighted Guidelines. 
B. THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY 
The profit policy of the Federal Government is set forth 
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): 
It is in the Government's interest to offer 
contractors opportunities for financial rewards 
sufficient to (1) stimulate efficient contract 
performance, (2) attract the best capabilities of 
qualified large and small business concerns to 
Government contracts, and (3) maintain a viable 
industrial base. 
Both the Government and contractors should be 
concerned with profit as a motivator of efficient 
and effective contract performance. Negotiations 
aimed merely at reducing prices by reducing profit, 
without proper recognition of the function of 
profit, are not in the Government's interest. [Ref 
6:p.15-37] 
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In addition, the FAR requires use of a structured approach for 
determining profit or fee objectives in acquisitions requiring 
cost analysis. DoD has established the Weighted Guidelines as 
the structured approach to be used for defense contracts. [Ref 
17:p.215.9-l] 
C.   THE WEIGHTED GUIDELINES 
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) Part 215, Subpart 215.9, describes the Weighted 
Guidelines (WGL) method to be used by DoD contracting 
personnel. The WGL are to be used in all negotiated contract 
actions requiring cost analysis, with certain exceptions 
identified by the DFARS. These exceptions are beyond the 
scope of this research. 
When performing cost analysis, DoD contracting officers 
will develop a prenegotiation profit objective. The profit 
objective is designed to [Ref 16:p.4-2]: 
reward contractors that take on the more 
difficult tasks requiring higher skills. 
encourage contractors to accept greater contract 
cost responsibility by establishing substantially 
different profit levels for different pricing 
arrangements and different cost-risk situations. 
• encourage  contractors  to  make  cost-effective 
capital investments. 
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•     encourage  contractors  to  use  nongovernment 
resources. 
In order to determine the prenegotiation profit 
objective, contracting officers use the DD Form 1547, Record 
of Weighted Guidelines Method Application. The DD 1547 [Ref 
17:p.215.9-2]: 
provides a vehicle for performing the analysis 
necessary to develop a profit objective; 
provides a format for summarizing profit amounts 
subsequently negotiated as part of the contract 
price; and 
serves as the principal source document for 
reporting profit statistics to DoD's management 
information system. 
The contracting officer also uses DD Form 1861, Contract 
Facilities Capital Cost of Money, to "report the facilities 
capital cost of money negotiated and to partially develop the 
facilities capital employed portion of the prenegotiation 
profit objective." [Ref l:p.74] 
D.   THE WEIGHTED GUIDELINES METHOD 
The Weighted Guidelines (WGL) focus on three primary 
profit factors: (1) Performance Risk; (2) Contract-type Risk; 
and  (3)  Facilities Capital Employed.   When developing a 
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prenegotiation profit objective, the contracting officer will 
assign a value to each profit factor. The values assigned by 
the contracting officer are based on a range of values 
designated for each profit factor. Each profit factor has a 
normal value which represents "average conditions on the 
prospective contract when compared to all goods and services 
acquired by DoD." [Ref 17:p.215.9-3] Additionally, a range of 
values is available for assignment under conditions the 
contracting officer determines to be above or below normal. 
E.   PERFORMANCE RISK 
This profit factor addresses "the contractor's degree of 
risk in fulfilling the contract requirements." [Ref 
17:p.215.9-3]  This factor consists of three elements: 
Technical -- the technical uncertainties of 
performance. 
Management -- the degree of management effort 
necessary to ensure that contract requirements 
are met. 
Cost control -- the contractor's efforts to 
reduce and control costs. 
For each of these elements, the contracting officer will 
assign a percentage weight based on its effect on total 
performance risk.  These three weights must total 100%.  The 
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contracting officer will then select a value for each element 
from the available range of values. The assigned value is 
multiplied by the element's weight, yielding a weighted value 
for each element. The three weighted values of Technical, 
Management, and Cost Control are then added to determine a 
composite value for Performance Risk. [Ref 17:p.215.9-4] 
The range of values available for assignment under 
Performance Risk is as follows [Ref 17:p.215.9-5]: 
Normal value       Designated range 
4% 2% to 6% 
The contracting officer will review the following critical 
performance elements when determining the value to assign to 
the Technical element [Ref 17:p.215.9-5]: 




Performance specifications and tolerances; 
Delivery schedules; and 
Extent of a warranty or guarantee. 
The contracting officer may assign a higher than average value 
if he determines that the subject contract poses a significant 
amount of technical risk.  Technical risk is increased if the 
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contractor is developing or applying advanced technologies, if 
the effort requires highly skilled personnel or if the work 
requires the use of state of the art machinery. Technical 
risk is also increased if the contractor must meet strict 
tolerance limits or exacting standards, or if the effort is 
for a new or highly complex item. [Ref 17:p.215.9-5] 
The contracting officer may assign a lower than average 
value if the acquisition is for off-the-shelf items, the 
requirements are simple, the technology involved is not 
complex, the effort is routine, or a mature program is 
involved. [Ref 17:p.215.9-6] 
The contracting officer will examine the below factors 
when determining the values to assign to the Management 
element [Ref 17:p.215.9-6]: 
The contractor's management and internal control 
systems. 
The • management  involvement  expected  on  the 
contract action. 
The degree of cost mix as an indication of the 
types of resources applied and value-added by the' 
contractor. 
The contractor's support of Federal socioeconomic 
programs. 
The contracting officer may assign a higher than normal 
value if he determines that the required management effort is 
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intense. A high degree of value-added effort by the 
contractor, a high level of coordination and active 
participation in Federal socioeconomic programs can lead the 
contracting officer to assign a higher than normal value. [Ref 
17:p.215.9-6] A below normal value may be assigned if 
management efforts are minimal, such as in mature programs or 
contracts requiring routine efforts. Low values may also be 
assigned if the contractor provides proposals which are 
untimely or are of poor quality, fails to provide an adequate 
analysis of subcontractor costs, or possesses unsatisfactory 
management and internal control systems. [Ref 17:pp.215.9-6,7] 
The contracting officer will evaluate the below factors 
when determining the values to assign to the Cost Control 
element [Ref 17:p.215.9-7]: 
The expected reliability of the contractor's cost 
estimates; 
The contractor's cost reduction initiatives; 
The  adequacy of  the  contractor's management 
approach to controlling cost and schedule; and 
Any other factors which affect the contractor's 
ability to meet the cost targets. 
The contracting officer may assign a higher than normal 
value if a contractor demonstrates a highly effective cost 
control program.  This includes contractors who provide fully 
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documented and reliable cost estimates, possess an aggressive 
cost reduction program, utilize a high degree of subcontractor 
competition, and have a proven track record of cost tracking 
and control. [Ref 17:p.215.9-7] The contracting officer may 
assign a lower than normal value in situations where the 
contractor's cost estimating system is marginal, the 
contractor has made minimal effort to initiate cost reduction 
programs, or the contractor has a record of cost overruns or 
other indication of unreliable cost estimates and lack of cost 
control. [Ref 17:p.215.9-8] 
F.   CONTRACT TYPE RISK 
The Contract Type risk factor focuses on the degree of 
cost risk accepted by the contractor under various contract 
types. [Ref 17:p.215.9-8] Included is a working capital 
adjustment added to the profit objective for Contract Type 
risk. This working capital adjustment only applies to fixed- 
price contracts which provide for progress payments. 
The range of values available for assignment under 
Contract Type risk is as follows (the WGL does not apply to 
Cost-plus-award-fee contracts) [Ref 17:p.215.9-9]: 
Normal Designated 
Contract type value Range 
Firm fixed-price, no financing       5% 4% to 6% 
Firm fixed-price with financing      3% 2% to 4% 
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1% 0% to 2% 
5% 0% to 1% 
0% to 1% 
<^9- 
.0% to 1 9- 
^9- 0% to 1 9- 
Fixed-price incentive, no financing  3%      2% to 4% 
Fixed-price, redeterminable (Treat as FPI/below normal) 




Labor hour contracts 
Firm fixed-price (Level of effort) 
When determining the value to be assigned, the 
contracting officer should consider the factors which may 
affect contract type risk. These factors include the length 
of the contract, adequacy of cost data, economic environment, 
nature and extent of subcontracts, and the protection provided 
to the contractor under contract provisions, such as economic 
price adjustment clauses. [Ref 17:p.215.9-9] 
As with Performance risk, the contracting officer may 
assign above or below normal values. If the contracting 
officer feels there is substantial contract type risk, he may 
assign a higher than a normal value. Conditions which may 
increase contract type risk include efforts with minimal cost 
history, long-term contracts without provisions protecting the 
contractor, or incentive provisions which place a high degree. 
of risk on the contractor. [Ref 17:p.215.9-10] The 
contracting officer may assign a below normal value if he 
determines the contract type risk is low.  Conditions which 
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may reduce contract type risk include very mature product 
lines with an extensive cost history, short-term contracts, 
contracts with provisions that substantially reduce the 
contractor's risk, or incentive provisions which place a low 
degree of risk on the contractor. [Ref 17:p.215.9-10,11] 
For those contracts under which the Government provides 
progress payments, the contracting officer must calculate the 
working capital adjustment. This calculation is made by 
multiplying the amount of costs financed by a contract length 
factor and an interest rate established by the Secretary of 
the Treasury. The contract length factor is the period that 
the contractor has a working capital investment in the 
contract. It is based on the time necessary for the 
contractor to complete the substantive portion of the work. 
This period is not necessarily the time between contract award 
and final delivery, and should not include contract option 
periods or, for multi-year contracts, the period of 
performance beyond the initial year's requirements. [Ref 
17:p.215.9-12] 
The contracting officer should use the following 
table to determine the contract length factor [Ref 17:p.215.9- 
12] : 
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Period to perform Contract length 
substantive portion (months) factor 
21 or less .40 
22 to 27 .65 
28 to 33 .90 
34 to 39 1.15 
40 to 45 1.40 
46 to 51 1.65 
52 to 57 1.90 
58 to 63 2.15 
64 to 69 2.40 
70 to 75 2.65 
76 or more 2.90 
If multiple deliveries are scheduled, the contracting officer 
may develop a weighted average value for contract length. [Ref 
17:p.215.9-12] 
G.   FACILITIES CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
Facilities Capital Employed (FCE) focuses on motivating 
contractors to invest capital in facilities that benefit DoD. 
This factor recognizes both the facilities capital employed in 
contract performance and the contractor's commitment to 
improving productivity. [Ref 17:p.215.9-12] 
The three elements considered under Facilities Capital 
Employed are land, buildings and equipment. The contracting 
officer will consider the book value of these facilities, as 
well as a contractor's formal investment plan if the 
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0% N/A 
15% 10 % to 20% 
35% 20 % to 50% 
contractor demonstrates DoD will realize benefits from the 
investment. [Ref 17:p.215.9-13] 
The contracting officer will select values for land 
buildings and equipment from the following list [Ref 
17:p.215.9-13]: 




For highly facilitized firms performing research and 
development or service contracts, the contracting officer will 
choose from the following range of values [Ref 17:p.215.9-13]: 




When considering the values assigned to FCE, the 
contracting officer must evaluate the potential benefits to 
DoD. He should review the usefulness of the facilities 
capital to the instant contract and analyze the improvement to 
productivity and other industrial base benefits resulting from 
the investment. [Ref 17:p.215.9-14] 
0% N/A 
5% 0s 5 to 10% 
20% 15s 5 to 25% 
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If the contracting officer determines the capital 
investment has direct, identifiable and exceptional benefits, 
he may assign higher than normal values. Factors which 
benefit DoD include new investments in state-of-the-art 
technology which reduce cost or improve product quality, or 
investments over and above the normal capital necessary to 
support DoD programs. [Ref 17:p.215.9-14] The contracting 
officer may also assign lower than normal values if the 
capital investment provides little benefit to DoD. This 
includes situations in which the contractor's capital 
investment applies primarily to commercial production, the 
investments are for furniture, fixtures or offices, or the 
facilities used are old or extensively idle. [Ref 17:p.215.9- 
15] 
Once the contracting officer determines the values to be 
used, these figures will be multiplied by dollar values 
assigned to land, buildings and equipment. These dollar 
figures are derived from calculations made by the contracting 
officer using DD Form 1861, Contract Facilities Cost of Money.' 
For the purposes of the study, the use of DD Form 1861 will 
not be discussed. 
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H.   CALCULATION OF PROFIT OBJECTIVE 
In order to illustrate the use of the Weighted Guidelines 
in determining prenegotiation profit objective, the following 
example calculation is provided: 





Direct Labor $700,000 
Indirect Expenses $950,000 
Other Direct Charges $40,000 
Subtotal $1,725,000 
General & Administrative $275,000 
Total costs $2,000,000 
The contracting officer made the following calculations for 
Performance Risk: 
Assigned Weight Assigned Value 
Technical                40% 5.0 
Management 30% 4.0 
Cost Control 30% 4.0 
Performance Risk composite 4.4 
The composite value of 4.4 will be multiplied by the base to 
determine a profit objective for Performance Risk: 
4.4% X $1,725,000 = $75,900 
For Contract Type Risk the contracting officer will 
multiply the assigned value, in this example 3.5%, by the base 
to determine profit objective for this element: 
3.5% X $1,725,000 = $60,375 
Next is the working capital adjustment: 
Costs financed     Length factor  Interest rate  Objective 
$500,000 .65 7.625% $29,738 
The contractor Facilities Capital Employed (FCE) objective is 
then calculated as follows: 
Assigned Value     Amount employed Objective 
Land 0% $6,000   
Buildings      10% $100,000 $10,000 
Eguipment      35% $400,000 $140,000 
Total FCE objective $150,000 
The total profit objective is: 
Performance Risk objective $75,900 
Contract Type Risk objective $60,375 
Working Capital Adjustment $29,738 
Total FCE objective $150,000 
TOTAL PROFIT OBJECTIVE $315,653 
The proposed profit rate is then determined: 
Total cost $2,000,000 
Facilities Capital 
Cost of Money (DD 1861) $40,000 
Profit objective $315,653 
Total price $2,355,653 
(FCCOM + Profit objective)/Total cost = Profit rate 
(40,000 + 315,653)/2,000,000 = 17.78%  Profit rate 
Once the contracting officer has determined the profit 
rate and profit objective, he will use these figures during 
negotiations with the contractor. The profit objective 
determined through the use of the Weighted Guidelines -is 
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intended to be a guide for the contracting officer, not a 
mandatory figure. It is a starting point upon which to base 
negotiations. Additionally, contractors are encouraged to 
develop their own profit objectives using the Weighted 
Guidelines. The goal is to enable the contractor to have a 
better understanding of the Government position. The 
Government also encourages contractors to use the Weighted 
Guidelines method to develop profit objectives for negotiating 
subcontracts. [Ref 17:p.215.9-2] 
I.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has explained the Federal Government's 
position on profit, described in detail the Weighted 
Guidelines method, and illustrated the use of the Weighted 
Guidelines through use of a basic example. The following 
chapter will describe results of a defense industry survey on 
the Weighted Guidelines. 
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IV.  DESCRIPTION OF DATA COLLECTED 
A. OVERVIEW 
In an effort to determine the opinions of defense 
contractors about DoD profit policy and the Weighted 
Guidelines, a questionnaire was sent to 100 companies. The 
questionnaire and associated cover letter is included as 
Appendix A. 
Of the 100 questionnaires mailed, 48 were returned, 
representing a 48% return rate. ■ Of the 48 respondents, three 
failed to correctly complete the questionnaire; their 
responses are excluded from the analysis. Additionally, phone 
interviews were held with representatives of several 
contractors.  The results are included herewith. 
B. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
Questions 1-6 were designed to provide demographic data 
on the respondents, including type of firm, amount of annual 
business with DoD, and number of employees. These data were 
used to identify trends within demographic groups. 
Question #1: 
Your firm is primarily a: (A) prime contractor; or (B) 
subcontractor. 
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The majority of respondents identified themselves as 
prime contractors, as is shown in Figure 1. 
Your firm is primarily a: 
(%) 
Prime contractor Subcontractor 
Figure  1.   Responses   to Question  #1 
Question   #2: 
Amount of annual business with DoD: 
The majority of respondents indicated a minimum of $1 
million of business conducted annually with DoD, as shown in 
Figure 2. The largest number of respondents, 31.1%, perform 
over $100 million in work. 
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Figure 2. Responses to Question #2 
Question #3: 
Number of employees: 
Those firms responding had a fairly even distribution of 
employee levels, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Responses to Question #3 
Question #4: 
Your primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC] 
Code, if known: 
Fifteen respondents provided their SIC codes; a complete 
listing of the responses is provided in Appendix B. 
Question #5: 
Percentage of your work which is  sole  source/non- 
competitive : 
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The percentage of sole source or non/competitive work 
performed by the respondents was distributed very evenly among 
possible responses, as shown in Figure 4. 






Figure 4. Responses to Question #5 
Question #6: 
What is your primary product or service? 
Respondents represented a wide and diverse range of 
defense products and services; a complete listing of responses 
is provided in Appendix B. 
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C.   SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Questions 7-11 were intended to elicit responses 
regarding general familiarity and use of the Weighted 
Guidelines within the defense industry, supplemented by 
respondent comments. 
Question #7: 
Are you familiar with DoD's Weighted Guidelines and the 
use of DP Form 1547? 
Of the 45 correctly completed surveys, 38 were familiar 
with the Weighted Guidelines, as shown in Figure 5. Only 
these 38 were asked to complete the remainder of the 
questionnaire; the percentages for all further questions are 
based on these 38 responses. The 38 respondents familiar with 
the Weighted Guidelines can further be divided by prime and 
subcontractor: 29 of 38, or 76.3%, were prime contractors, 
while the remaining nine, or 23.7%, were subcontractors. 
These figures mirror the distribution of total respondents, as 
discussed in question 1. 
46 
Figure 5. Responses to Question #7 
Question #8: 
Does your firm use the Weighted Guidelines, including DP 
Form 1547, to prepare for negoti ations wi th the Government? 
If yes, how do es your use of the Weighted Guidel ines affect 
the negotiat ion process ?  If not, why not? How do« 2S your firm 
establish profit objective? 
As shown in Figure 6, the majority of respondents do not 
use the WGL to prepare for negotiations with the Government. 
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Figure 6. Responses to Question #8 
Those respondents who use the WGL to prepare for 
negotiations with the Government indicated a desire to 
establish a common frame of reference for discussions with the 
contracting officer. These firms felt that the WGL allow them 
to understand the Government position. Those firms who do not 
use the WGL generally use other means, such as shareholder' 
expectations or corporate goals, to establish profit 
obj ective. 
Respondents who use the WGL made the following comments: 
As a guide only - this helps us understand the 
Government's position although we might not 
agree. 
Helps understand the customer's position. 
Enables a common-base discussion of factors 
affecting profit/fee. 
We use the approach to establish our basis for 
discussing our proposed profit objectives. 
It's only used if the Government negotiator makes 
reference to it. 
We use it to establish a profit objective. It 
allows the parties to reach a fair and reasonable 
price providing both parties can agree on the 
factors. 
Only as a check to determine where the Government 
will be coming from. 
Only to independently assess the Government's use 
of the method. 
We use it for (1) a check on the relationship to 
what we propose, and (2) development of arguments 
to support the profit position during 
negotiations. 
To substantiate profit objectives. 
WGL does not have a large impact because it is 
subjective; the customer's calculations tend to 
be lower than the contractor's. 
I will push to get a profit in line with WGL and 
build a case for using higher than average 
factors. 
Delays the negotiation process because of the 
subjectiveness. 
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Resp ondents who do not use the WGL made the following 
comments: 
• Subjective risk assessment. 
• They are too subjective. 
• Negotiate. 
• Standard bid is 10-20% depending on type of 
contract. 
• Profit is established on basis of solicitation, 
competitive bid or sole source, per product, lot 
quantity to manufacture. 
• The WGL have little basis in "business" reality. 
Our firm's profit objectives are a function of 
corporate profit goals.  Most WGL calculations 
fall below these goals. 
• The WGL method does not properly reflect the 
fundamental rule associating risk and return to 
the contractor. 
• Profit objectives cannot be established by a 
form.    They are  set by management  to meet 
shareholder return objectives. 
• We use the actual manufacturing costs from our 
standard commercial cost systems and apply a 
fixed percentage gross margin. 
• We establish objectives based on a return on 
capital   employed   as   determined   by   our 
shareholders.  The WGL can be manipulated based 
on  subjective  evaluation  of  risk  by  the 
evaluator. 
• Our  profit  objective  is  based  on  risk  and 
investment. 
• Management direction based on competition and 
historical experience for similar contracts. 
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We use a standard commercial pricing approach. 
Management discretion based on cost of capital, 
unallowables, and required rates of return. 
We propose and negotiate with profit objectives 
expressed as a percentage of most probable cost. 
Based on commercial profits.  Weighted Guidelines 
are too limiting/myopic. 
The Government shares their calculations.   No 
advantage in having our own. 
Question #9: 
Does your firm use the Weighted Guidelines, including DP 
Form 1547, to prepare for negotiations with other contractors? 
If not, why not? 
The vast majority of respondents do not use the WGL to 
prepare for negotiations with other contractors, as shown in 
Figure 7. In general, these firms felt that the WGL are not 
relevant for commercial negotiations, since the WGL are not 
widely used within industry. Additionally, respondents cited 
a desire to avoid the paperwork burden associated with 
performing a WGL analysis, as well as a perceived lack of 
advantage to use of the WGL. 
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Figure 7. Responses to Question #9 
Comments by respondents included the following: 
Normally other contractors do not use WGL. We 
use WGL when the prime is familiar with it and 
they use it. 
Not relevant. 
Paperwork burden not necessary; negotiators 
authorized to settle based on their judgment. 
95% of awards are based on competition. We 
adjust profit to a level where we believe we can 
win an award. 
We examine the level of risk and also the 
investment of company resources/talent in order 
to determine the amount of fee/profit which needs 
to be earned on a particular job. 
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• Serves no purpose. 
• Non-negotiable. 
• Other contractors do not use WGL. 
• Do not perceive an advantage. 
• Most of our contractors could care less about the 
Weighted Guidelines. The percentages seem 
arbitrary. 
• Not meaningful or widely used in our industry. 
• Automotive industry is not receptive nor 
accustomed to WGL. 
Question #10: 
Do you believe the Weighted Guidelines approach favors 
any particular set of contractors? If yes, please explain. 
The responses to question 10 provided no real consensus. 
There was a relatively even distribution with a significant 
number, 26.3%, of non-responses. Overall, those respondents 
who did not believe the WGL favored any particular set of 
contractors outweighed those who did by a slight margin. Among 
respondents indicating a belief in WGL "bias", virtually all 
felt that the WGL favor, large prime contractors with 
significant investment in facilities and equipment, and highly 
skilled technical personnel. Figure 8 represents responses to 
question 10. 
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Figure 8. Responses to Question #10 
Comments by respondents included the following: 
Favors slightly those contractors who own their 
own facilities and possess highly skilled 
technical personnel. 
Manufacturers are favored by the weights assigned 
which do not consider the investment in 
facilities sometimes required to perform service 
contracts. 
Major prime contractors with sole source 
contracts. 
Very large primes with significant investment in 
buildings, facilities and equipment. 
Well established large contractors have resources 
to justify higher fees pursuant to the WGL 
criteria.  Smaller companies don't. 
54 
• Large firms with highly structured overhead 
pools, large capital investments and complex cost 
structures. 
• Those with large investments in buildings and 
equipment should be able to achieve a higher 
profit to compensate them for their capital 
investments. WGL support higher profit 
objectives that do have higher investments. 
• It favors contractors who are primarily defense 
contractors. You can game the form by making 
most costs overhead vs. G & A. Commercial 
contractors have no incentive to do this. 
• Via the Government person who is applying the 
approach. 
Question #11: 
Do you believe the Weighted Guidelines approach is more 
effective when used to negotiate: (A) Fixed-price contracts; 
(B) Cost-reimbursement contracts; or (C) Equally effective in 
both cases. 
A significant number of respondents, 42.1%, failed to 
answer this question. A small number felt the WGL are most 
effective when negotiating fixed-price contracts, while 
approximately twice as many felt the approach is most 
effective for cost-reimbursement negotiations. An identical 
number felt the WGL are equally effective under either 
contract type.  Figure 9 represents responses to question 11. 
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Effectiveness of WGL by Contract Type 
(%) 
Fixed-price 
C o st-re i m b u rse m e nt 
Equally effective 
^     No response 
Figure 9. Responses to Question #11 
Respondents were asked to answer questions 12 through 24 
by selecting from the choices of Agree, Neutral or Disagree. 
5 respondents, 13.2%, failed to complete this portion of the 
questionnaire. These questions were designed to elicit 
opinions on specific aspects of the Weighted Guidelines, as 
well as a general overview of the effectiveness of the policy. 
Question #12: 
DoD contracting officers have a good understanding of how 
to interpret and apply the Weighted Guidelines. 
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Only a  small percentage,  28.9%,  agreed with  this 
statement.  Figure 10 represents responses to question 12. 





^     No response 
Figure  10.   Responses  to Question  #12 
Question   #13: 
Contractor capital investment is fairly rewarded under 
the Weighted Guidelines approach. 
Only 15.8% agreed with this statement; 44.7% disagreed. 
Figure 11 represents responses to question 13. 
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,A      No response 
Figure 11. Responses to Question #13 
Question #14: 
The current Weighted Guidelines approach is sufficiently 
flexible to provide adequate profits to the majority of 
contractors. 
The majority of respondents, 55.3%, disagreed with this 
statement. Only 15.8% agreed, with an equal number neutral. 
Figure 12 represents responses to question 14. 





2,     No response 
Figure  12.   Responses  to Question  #14 
Question  #15: 
Negotiated contractor profits would be higher if DoD did 
not use the Weighted Guidelines. 
A significant number of respondents, 36.8%, were neutral 
to this statement, representing the most prevalent response. 
Slightly more than one-third, 34.2%, agreed with this 
statement. Only 15.8% disagreed. Figure 13 represents 
responses to question 15. 
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Figure 13. Responses to Question #15 
Question #16: 
The range of values available for assignment by DoD 
contracting officers provides adequate recognition of a 
contractor's performance risk. 
A large number of respondents, 57.9%, disagreed with this 
statement. Only 7.9% of the respondents agreed, while nearly 
three times as many, 21%, were neutral. Figure 14 represents 
responses to question 16. 
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Figure 14.- Responses to Question #16 
Question #17: 
I frequently have significant differences with the 
contracting officer's use of the Weighted Guidelines and DP 
Form 1547. 
A large majority of respondents, 57.9%, agreed with this 
statement. A small number of the respondents, 7.9%, disagreed 
while nearly three times as many, or 21%, were neutral. 
Figure 15 represents responses to question 17. 
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Figure 15. Responses to Question #17 
Question #18: 
The use and application of the DP Form 1547 is clear and 
understandable. 
Only 15.8% of the respondents agreed with this statement. 
Exactly twice as many, 31.6%, were neutral. An even larger 
number of respondents, 36.8%, disagreed. Figure 16 represents 
responses to question 18. 
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Figure 16. Responses to Question 18 
Question #19: 
The range of values available for assignment by the 
contracting officer provides adequate recognition of the risk 
to the contractor associated with various contract types. 
Very few of the respondents, only 10.5%, agreed with this 
statement. Over four times as many, 44.7%, disagreed. 
Additionally, a significant number, 31.6%, were neutral. 
Figure 17 represents responses to question 19. 
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Figure 17. Responses to Question #19 
Question #20: 
The Weighted Guidelines factors for facilities capital 
employed are sufficient to encourage capital investment. 
A large majority of respondents, 65.8%, disagreed with 
this statement. Only one of the thirty-eight respondents, or 
2.6%, agreed. In addition, 18.4% of respondents were neutral. 
Figure 18 represents responses to question 20. 
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Figure 18. Responses to Question #20 
Question #21: 
The Weighted Guidelines, as a vehicle for implementation 
of DoD's profit policy, provide sufficient incentive for 
contractors to remain active members of the defense industrial 
base. 
The vast majority of respondents, 78.9%, disagreed with 
this statement. None of the respondents agreed; 7.9% were 
neutral.  Figure 19 represents responses to question 21. 
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Figure   19.   Responses   to  Question   #21 
Question   #22: 
The Weighted Guidelines are used more as a crutch to 
justify the final negotiated price than as a tool to develop 
an appropriate profit objective. 
A large majority of the respondents, 65.8%, agreed with 
this statement. Only 7.9% of the respondents disagreed with 
the statement, while 13.2% were neutral. Figure 20 represents 
responses to question 22. 
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Figure 20. Responses to Question #22 
Question #23: 
Regardless  of  the  Weighted  Guidelines,  specific 
contractors are out for a specific return on each contract. 
The vast majority of the respondents, 71%, agreed with 
this statement.  Only 5.3% disagreed with the statement, while 
10.5% were neutral.   Figure 21 represents responses to 
question 23. 
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Figure 21. Responses to Question #23 
Question #24: 
The Weighted Guidelines is a fair and effective means of 
establishing profit objective. 
Question 24 was designed to serve as a summary of 
questions 12 through 23. The negative opinions of the WGL 
expressed through the previous questions were reflected by the 
63.2% of respondents who disagreed with this statement. Only 
2.6% agreed; 21% were neutral. Figure 22 represents responses 
to question 24 . 
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Figure 22. Responses to Question #24 
Questions 25 and 26 were designed to elicit opinions on 
the future of the Weighted Guidelines and industry 
recommendations for improvement. 
Question #25: 
Do you feel the Weighted Guidelines approach should be: 
(A)  Retained as is;  (B) Modified;  (C)  Replaced;  or  (D) 
Eliminated. 
Dissatisfaction with the WGL was reflected by the 
majority of respondents, 55.3%, who recommended elimination of 
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the approach. No respondents recommended retaining the system 
in its present form. Figure 23 represents responses to 
question   25. 
The WGL should be: 
(%) 




Figure 23. Responses to Question #25 
Question #26: 
What changes, if any, would you make to improve the 
Weighted Guidelines? 
The majority of responses focused on two areas: total 
elimination of the Weighted Guidelines, and a desire for 
increased emphasis on risk.  In general, many respondents felt 
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the contracting officer should be allowed to use "business 
judgment" to determine profit rate during negotiations. 
Others recommended making the WGL more "user-friendly", and 
improved training for Government personnel. 
Comments by respondents included the following: 
• Eliminate the subjectivity of the form. 
• Emphasize that these are guidelines - not factors 
written in stone. The CO needs some basis other 
than a number from thin air but WGL is just that, 
and it is based on a very subjective evaluation 
of each factor. 
• The range of values available for assignment 
should be more clearly defined; too much is left 
to interpretation. 
• Eliminate. 
• Eliminate it and leave it up to the contractor to 
negotiate. 
• Do away with them. 
• Eliminate them and allow each CO to negotiate in 
a real free market environment. 
• Eliminate it. 
• Throw them out and start anew! 
• Eliminate - encourage a structural approach in 
determining profit/fee that is an acceptable 
return on investment. 
• Recognize that any contract contains risk and 
that there should be a realistic expectation on 
all parties' part that a contractor must make a 
reasonable profit. I would recommend less 
concern about profit and more focus on the 
elements of cost of a contract. 
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Consideration should be given to what constitutes 
an acceptable return, but no Government official 
wants to be questioned by Congress if the profit 
is perceived to be too high. The WGL allow the 
CO to say, "I followed the form, there must be a 
problem with the rules, not me". 
The risk section should be the most significant 
driving factor in determining profit. To do so 
adequately would require the promulgation of a 
very large form to include contractor concerns. 
Greater recognition of risk. 
More emphasis on risk. 
More specific statement of desired results and 
basis for payment for results. Risk factors are 
too general to be meaningful. 
Simplify the completion of the form. 
Make it more user-friendly; less bureaucratic. 
Indoctrinate Government representatives to use 
WGL to justify profit in lieu of using it to 
reduce profit. 
Provide better training to Government buyers 
using them. 
Provide more guidance; provide more definitions 
and examples; give the buyer more flexibility; 
preclude commands from requiring absolute 
adherence; get realistic in the amount of margin 
provided for. 
Think logically; you can't legislate profit 
objectives. 
There is nothing wrong with WGL if equity is 
applied, which is not always the case. 
None - they seem to accomplish what they are 
intended to do. 
Question 27 was designed to allow respondents to present 
a final, overall characterization of the Weighted Guidelines. 
Question #27: 
How would you characterize DoD's profit policy, including 
the Weighted Guidelines and the DP Form 1547? 
Again, the majority of comments were negative. Specific 
comments by respondents included the following: 
• The basic policy is sound. The WGL might be 
better expressed as a range, not an absolute. 
• It is a good basis to use as long as PCOs do not 
predetermine maximum profit rate. 
• In general, unrealistic. If a company can't make 
at least 10-15% profit on routine orders, it will 
not be able to stay in business. 
• Regardless of the profit resulting from WGL, from 
my experience profit rates of 10-15% are 
negotiated on firm fixed-price contracts and 7- 
10% on cost-type contracts. 
• The Government does not use WGL in negotiating 
unless it is to their advantage. Often WGL will 
calculate a 10-12% profit and the Government 
expects us to accept historical percentages which 
are much lower (8-9%) . 
• A necessary evil. In today's competitive 
environment, the policy is only marginally 
relevant. 
• Cheap. 





Highly interpretive, subjective. 
Inconsistent and varying; depends on specific 
agency and level of CO. 
The guidelines are arbitrary. A wide range of 
values can be established by the CO based upon 
his/her subjective evaluation. Therefore, they 
lend a false sense of precision to an arbitrary 
process. 
DD Form 1547 was designed by the DoD, for the 
DoD, to benefit the DoD. If a WGL approach is 
mandatory, DoD and private industry should work 
together to modify the format to allow wider 
flexibility. 
In the commercial world, profits depend on the 
marketplace - the better you provide a product 
the better the return; no such incentive with the 
Government. 
DoD seems to feel that profit is a dirty word. 
The entire thrust of the WGL approach appears to 
be to provide the CO with a means to support his 
actions and to ensure that no one makes very much 
more than the next guy. 
Great for MBAs. Contractors will do whatever 
they must to win. We need to have an 
understanding between Government and industry on 
where we want to go.  We can work together. 
A policy, as such, is appropriate, but the 
Government is completely unrealistic in terms of 
returns required by the investing public. 
Minimizes contractor profit to the maximum extent 
possible. 
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It's the absolute Big Brother syndrome - the 
Government is telling the contractor what his 
risk is worth. 
I view the WGL as a tool that allows both parties 
some guidance in arriving at a fair and 
reasonable price. Obviously there is a great 
deal of subjectivity in the application of the 
factors. 
Respondents  were  then  asked to provide  any additional 
comments, as desired.  These comments include the following: 
Guidelines tend to become fixed points, like 
legal opinions and audit reports. They are all 
supposed to be advisory with the responsibility 
for a decision left to the CO, but pity the poor 
CO who decides contrary to one of his "advisors" 
without pages of justification. 
My company routinely delivers a quality product 
on time. These facts are virtually ignored by 
those persons using the WGL. If you are really 
interested in retaining good suppliers, change 
the system to reward those that perform. 
DoD needs to incentivize the industrial base to 
do defense work, not avoid it due to unacceptable 
return. 
If a company has experienced production problems 
in the past, i.e. required materials are 
difficult to obtain, high scrap rates, labor 
intense, many complicated manufacturing 
processes, etc., then expect proposed profit to 
be high due to the inherent risks involved. 
Another factor is history; did the company make 
or lose money on previous orders? These are the 
true guidelines used by most companies to 
determine profit objectives, guidelines which are 
not addressed in the WGL work sheet. Government 
contracting employees rarely understand the above 
because so few have worked in private industry. 
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Many negotiations go to a bottom line settlement 
where the parties never agree on or negotiate 
profit as a separate item under fixed-price 
contracts. 
We need to understand in a capitalistic society 
it is OK to make money, even at the taxpayer's 
expense. If the buyer is getting what is wanted, 
the taxpayer benefits. We are all taxpayers, so 
no one wants the Government to be overcharged, 
but at the same time contractors have to make a 
return on investment. 
As Government personnel become more familiar with 
the profit expected for that kind of 
commodity/service, that is fair and reasonable to 
both sides, they will rely less on the WGL form 
and more on good business judgment. 
COs, in my experience-, do not have a good 
understanding of profit. Many seem to feel it is 
their moral obligation to all but eliminate 
profit. The WGL are only as good as people using 
it are trained to use it. If COs and negotiators 
understood the importance of profit to industry, 
I believe this alone would be a significant 
improvement. 
The Government should have policies and 
guidelines for procurement activities to follow. 
But they must learn to procure from commercial 
businesses using commercial practices. The 
market will reward the best products/services and 
the best managed businesses. 
The Weighted Guidelines are, in my opinion,' 
misused. PCOs tend to use them to lock into 
unrealistically low profit objectives, then use 
them as a "lever" to justify not moving in profit 
during negotiations. 
I think the WGL are a vehicle for posturing in 
negotiations. The WGL are a vehicle for 
communication of positions and is suitable for 
that purpose. 
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While working at DCASMA San Diego, I learned that 
most contract administrators really did not know 
how to properly use Weighted Guidelines; numerous 
errors were common. 
The Government does not use the WGL in 
negotiating unless it is to their advantage. 
Often WGL will calculate a 10-12% profit and the 
Government expects us to accept historical 
percentages which are much lower (8-9%). 
Subjective judgment of performance will generally 
serve only Government profit objectives. 
Profit is important, but smaller contractors 
believe that what they are doing is important, 
maybe more so than a profit projection. Some of 
us would continue doing business with DoD if we 
could get a modest 0-5% profit. It can be 
rewarding if we can make a difference. Money 
isn't everything! 
D.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the data received from 
respondents' questionnaires. The major points can be 
summarized as follows: 
The vast majority of respondents were familiar 
with the WGL, but less than half use the approach 
to prepare for negotiations with the Government; 
even fewer use the WGL to prepare for 
negotiations with other firms. 
The majority feel the WGL are not flexible enough 
to provide adequate profits. 
The WGL do not adequately recognize performance 
risk or contract-type risk, nor does the method 
incentivize capital investment. 
77 
The WGL do not incentivize contractors to remain 
active members of the defense industrial base. 
The majority of contractors desire a specific 
return regardless of WGL. 
The majority of respondents feel the WGL approach 
is not a fair and effective means of establishing 
profit objective. 
All the respondents feel the WGL should be 
modified, replaced, or eliminated. 
The following chapter will analyze and discuss the data in 
detail. 
V.      ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of 
the results described in Chapter IV, as well as- general 
observations made by the researcher in the course of the 
study. Where appropriate, contractor comments listed in 
Chapter IV will be repeated to clarify points of discussion. 
B. OVERALL VIEW OF THE WEIGHTED GUIDELINES 
Several of the questions asked as part of this research 
were designed to elicit overall, "big picture" opinions of the 
Weighted Guidelines (WGL). The results of these questions can 
be summarized as follows: 
• Only 15.8% of respondents agreed that the current 
Weighted Guidelines are sufficiently flexible to 
provide adequate profits to the majority of 
contractors. 
• Only 15.8% disagreed that contractor profits 
would be higher if DoD did not use the Weighted 
Guidelines. 
• Only 15.8% believed that the use and application 
of the DD Form 1547 is clear and understandable.' 
• A majority of 65.8% believed that Weighted 
Guidelines are used more as a crutch to justify 
final negotiated price than as a tool to develop 
an appropriate profit objective. 
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Only one respondent, or 2.6%, agreed that the 
Weighted Guidelines approach is a fair and 
effective means of establishing profit objective. 
The vast majority, 89.5%, of respondents believed 
that the Weighted Guidelines should be modified, 
replaced or eliminated; none agreed that the 
Weighted Guidelines should be retained as is. 
These results present a very negative picture of the WGL, 
from the perspective of the defense industry. This is not 
altogether surprising; Government and industry tend to regard 
each other as adversaries. 
Respondents were also asked to characterize DoD's profit 
policy, including the Weighted Guidelines and DD Form 1547. 
Comments in response to this question were overwhelmingly 
negative.  Representative comments include: 
Cheap 
Out of date 
Confused 
Obsolete 
A necessary evil; in 
environment the policy 
relevant. 
today's  competitive 
is  only  marginally 
In general, respondents feel that profit policy, and WGL in 
particular, does not properly reward risk and investment, 
fails to incentivize firms to remain in the defense 
marketplace, and fails to reward firms for providing quality 
products or services.   These views will be analyzed and 
discussed in detail below. 
C.   RISK AND RETURN 
The Weighted Guidelines are designed to allow the 
contracting officer (CO) to address contractor risk during the 
process of determining prenegotiation profit objectives. 
Values assigned to Performance Risk and Contract-type Risk 
should reflect the degree of risk assumed by the contractor 
under the instant contract. 
Results of the research indicate that a large number of 
defense contractors feel that DoD does not properly recognize 
risk as a profit determinant. The following comments 
highlight this point: 
It's the absolute Big Brother syndrome; the 
Government is telling the contractor what his 
risk is worth. 
The risk section should be the most significant 
driving factor in determining profit. 
"Risk factors" are too general to be meaningful. 
[The Weighted Guidelines need] greater 
recognition of risk. 
More emphasis on risk. 
The view that the WGL fail to adequately recognize risk is 
substantiated by other survey results: 
Only 7.9% of respondents agreed that the range of 
values available for assignment by DoD COs under 
the WGL adequately recognizes performance risk. 
Only 10.5% of respondents agreed that the range 
of values available for assignment by DoD COs 
under the WGL adequately recognizes contract-type 
risk. 
The research indicates that prime contractors appear to 
be more concerned with risk than subcontractors. Seventy-five 
percent of the responding prime contractors felt the WGL do 
not adequately recognize performance risk, while just 44.4% of 
subcontractors cited this belief. Similarly, 58.3% of prime 
contractors and 33.3% of subcontractors felt the WGL do not 
adequately recognize contract-type risk. In both instances 
the majority of subcontractors, 55.3%, were neutral. 
Concern with this issue can be assessed by the number of 
references to risk made by the respondents in their narrative 
responses. Most of the comments were of a brief nature, with 
little or no substantiation or examples. Only 28.9% made 
comments on risk or risk-related subjects. Of the prime 
contractors, 27.6% commented on risk; 33.3% of the 
subcontractors made similar comments. 
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The small number of comments made regarding risk does not 
reflect the dissatisfaction with the WGL apparent from the 
overall percentages described above. This may indicate that 
WGL recognition of risk, while a concern, is not as important 
as other issues. It is possible that the respondents believed 
no comment was necessary due to the responses provided for 
other questions. It is also interesting to note that, while 
only 10.5% of respondents felt that the WGL adequately 
recognize contract-type risk, no narrative comments were made 
on this issue.  Contract-type risk may be a low priority. 
Clearly, if contractors felt their risk was not being 
adequately recognized by the Government, they would cease to 
perform Government work. In line with the economic theory of 
profit, some investments (or in this case DoD contracts) will 
make a profit, while others will not. If failure to make a 
profit was a frequent occurrence, there would be few if any 
firms left in the defense marketplace. Since there are still 
many firms willing to perform DoD work, adequate profit must 
be available. But, as the economic theory of profit also 
states, those who take larger risks expect a larger reward. 
It is likely, in the researcher's opinion, that defense 
contractors feel that DoD business, while profitable, is not 
as profitable as it should be considering the risks involved. 
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Related to risk is the matter of return on investment. 
Many of the respondents indicated a belief that DoD does not 
understand nor provide the defense industry with a reasonable 
return on investment.  Comments include: 
• ...there should be a realistic expectation on all 
parties' part that a contractor must make a 
reasonable profit. 
• Consideration should be given to what constitutes 
an acceptable return. 
• ...unrealistic. If a company can't make at least 
10-15% profit...it will not be able to stay in 
business. 
• ...the Government is completely unrealistic in 
terms of returns required by the investing 
public. 
This view appears to run counter to the Government's stated 
goal of incentivizing efficient contract performance by 
"offering sufficient financial rewards". [Ref 6:p.15-37] 
However, a great deal depends on one's definition of 
"sufficient financial rewards". For example, one of the 
respondents indicated a need to make at least 10-15% profit to 
stay in business. In this firm's view, 10-15% is "sufficient 
reward". Unfortunately, this type of figure cannot be 
generalized. Contracts with a large degree of risk and 
uncertainty deserve a larger profit than contracts with low 
risk factors.  At the same time, many other factors must be 
considered. Is the firm as efficient as possible? What has 
the firm done to mitigate its costs? Obviously, no firm is 
100% efficient, but as efficiency increases and unnecessary 
costs decrease, the amount of profit required to "stay in 
business" will decrease. Additionally, as several respondents 
noted, companies must deal with corporate goals, shareholder 
expectations, and other forces which may take little or no 
regard to business mix or the risk involved with contracts 
assumed. 
D.   CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
The WGL are also designed to promote capital investment 
by contractors. However, only 15.8% of the respondents 
indicated a belief that the current WGL approach fairly 
rewards capital investment. Additionally, only 2.6% of 
respondents agreed that the WGL factors for facilities capital 
employed are sufficient to encourage capital investment; 65.8% 
disagreed. These results mirror a 1989 study regarding the 
effect of DoD profit policy on capital investment. In that 
study, 75% of the defense contractors interviewed indicated 
that DoD's profit policy provided inadequate or no incentive 
to invest in more productive facilities and equipment. [Ref 
4:p.73] No comments were made by the respondents regarding 
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capital investment issues due to, in the researcher's 
estimation, a perceived lack of relevance of the WGL approach. 
It would seem, despite initiatives to encourage investment 
such as those resulting from the Profit '76 Study, that the 
defense industry still does not feel that DoD profit policy 
and the  WGL provide proper incentive to invest. 
It is unrealistic to believe that capital investment 
within the defense industry is going to increase in today's 
economic environment. The availability of future defense 
business is too uncertain. The majority of firms will not be 
willing to invest in facilities, buildings and equipment 
without long-term commitments; even those firms holding 
existing defense contracts may be hesitant to invest for fear 
of program decreases or cancellation. At the same time, many 
firms are attempting to convert production from defense 
products to commercial products. These firms will be more 
likely to invest in support of these initiatives over 
investment in defense-related facilities. In addition, 
competition and a lack of business have forced many 
contractors to reduce overhead costs. Many firms are closing, 
consolidating, or selling facilities, not building new ones. 
As the research has shown, the WGL did not meet the goal of 
incentivizing capital investment when the defense business was 
booming during the 1980s.  It is extremely unlikely the policy 
will encourage investment now. 
E.   ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
As discussed in Chapter III, the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) indicates that profit is an essential 
component of Government contracts. According to the FAR, 
"negotiations aimed merely at reducing prices by reducing 
profit, without proper recognition of the function of profit, 
are not in the Government's interest". [Ref 6:p. 15-37] Given 
this direction, it would follow that Government contracting 
officers would strive to negotiate a profit that is fair and 
provides proper motivation to the contractor. Comments made 
by survey respondents indicate otherwise. 
Several respondents indicated that, in their opinion, 
Government COs were primarily concerned with minimization of 
total contract price without regard to a fair and equitable 
profit.  Three responses in particular summarize this view: 
• DoD seems to feel that profit is a dirty word. 
• The basic problem with the WGL and DoD's profit 
policy is the basic underlying belief that profit 
is to be minimized vs. an incentive or motivator. 
• ...minimizes contractor profit to the maximum 
extent possible. 
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In addition, several respondents indicated a belief that 
DoD contracting personnel utilized the WGL in a manner so as 
to avoid criticism or undue oversight from superiors. Two 
contractor comments are particularly enlightening in this 
regard: 
. . .no Government official wants to be questioned 
by Congress if the profit is perceived to be too 
high. 
...pity the poor CO who decides contrary to one 
of his "advisors" without pages of justification. 
These responses seem to indicate an organizational culture 
within the DoD acquisition community that, regardless of FAR 
guidance, encourages contracting officers to attempt to 
minimize contract price, including profit, at all costs, and 
develop negotiation objectives which will please superiors, 
but not necessarily provide incentive to the contractor. 
In light of the motivational role of profit within 
private industry, a goal of minimizing total contract price 
while seeking to incentivize efficient and effective contract 
performance is contradictory. As the contracting officer 
seeks to reduce the total price of a contract, thus reducing 
the compensation paid to the contractor, the amount of risk 
borne by the contractor increases. As risk increases, the 
amount of profit  expected by the contractor  (under the 
economic theory of profit) will increase.  Based 
on the above comments, the expected level of profit is not 
being provided by the Government. 
On the other hand, respondent comments show a lack of 
concern or understanding of the CO's role as a guardian of 
taxpayer funds.  One respondent even suggested that "...it is 
OK to make money, even at the taxpayer's expense".  These 
responses suggest to the researcher a lack of perspective 
within the organizational culture of the defense industry. 
Negotiation should be a two-way process, the goal of which is 
to arrive at a fair and reasonable price that is mutually 
agreeable to both buyer and seller.  Based on the research, 
industry expects the Government to accede to all its demands. 
Despite industry's desires, contracting officers must 
answer to higher authority; it is probable that some COs do 
attempt to minimize profit, rather than negotiate a fair 
profit.   It is the nature of Government that mistakes, 
perceived or actual, may result in additional oversight, 
Congressional action, and unfavorable press coverage.  Under 
these pressures, the CO must balance taxpayer interests with 
contractor interests.  Contractor negotiators must answer to 
higher authority as well.  In the researcher's opinion, it is 
likely that some respondents are trying to blame Government 
COs' use of the WGL for less than desired profit rates. 
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Organizational culture within the acquisition community 
was recently addressed in an amendment to the FAR, the 
Statement of Guiding Principles for the Federal Acquisition 
System. This document was released by the Federal Acquisition 
Regulatory Council, effective 03 July 1995. Key points of 
interest: 
...Government members of the [Acquisition] Team 
must be empowered to make acquisition decisions 
within their areas of responsibility, including 
selection, negotiation, and administration of 
contracts consistent . with the Guiding 
Principles....The contracting officer must have the 
authority to the maximum extent practicable and 
consistent with the law, to determine the 
application of rules, regulations, and policies on 
a specific contract. 
The authority to make decisions and the 
accountability for the decisions made will be 
delegated to the lowest level within the System, 
consistent with law. [Ref 7:pp.10-11] 
If the organizational culture described by the respondents 
truly exists within DoD, the empowerment described by the 
Statement of Guiding Principles may encourage COs to negotiate 
profit rates without as much concern for oversight and 
criticism from above. 
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F.   BIAS IN THE WEIGHTED GUIDELINES 
There appears to be a perception among some respondents 
that the Weighted Guidelines method is biased towards large, 
well-established contractors. A significant number, 34.2%, 
indicated a belief that the WGL are biased; their comments 
include the following: 
Favors slightly those contractors who own their 
own facilities and possess highly skilled 
technical personnel. 
Major prime contractors with sole source 
contracts. 
Very large primes with significant investments in 
buildings,•facilities, and equipment. 
Based on these comments, it is reasonable to assume that this 
opinion would be held by subcontractors and small companies. 
However, of the 13 respondents who indicated a belief in WGL 
bias, seven were prime contractors while just six were 
subcontractors. Thus, many of the respondents who indicated 
a belief in WGL bias toward large firms are themselves large 
firms. It is probable that these large firms base their 
opinions on actual experience, though there was nothing in the 
comments to substantiate this. Regardless, the perception 
exists, at least among these firms. Additionally, of the 20 
small firms (defined by the researcher as those firms with 
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less than 1,000 employees) responding to the survey, only six 
identified a belief in WGL bias. This would indicate that the 
majority of these small companies have experienced nothing 
that would lead them to believe in WGL bias toward large, or 
any other category of, contractors. It is interesting to note 
that 26.3% of total respondents failed to answer this 
question. It is possible that the respondents were unsure how 
to answer, had no strong opinion, or simply overlooked the 
question. 
The WGL are designed to avoid bias in certain situations. 
When calculating the values to assign to Facilities Capital 
Employed for highly facilitized manufacturing firms performing 
research and development or services contracts, the 
contracting officer is provided with an alternate, lower range 
of values to use for Land, Buildings, and Equipment. [Ref 
19:p.215.9-13] Otherwise, the values are designed to relate 
"the usefulness of the facilities capital to the goods or 
services being acquired under the prospective contract". [Ref 
19:p.215.9-14] In other words, the CO will reward quality, 
not quantity. 
It is probable that large, well-established manufacturers 
will have the resources necessary to acquire new equipment or 
state-of-the-art technology, hence gaining a competitive 
advantage over smaller firms.  This in itself could lead some 
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firms to conclude that the WGL, and Government acquisition in 
general, may favor the larger companies. However, the goal of 
profit policy and the WGL is not to evaluate the capabilities 
of an offeror; that is the function of the source selection 
process. The purpose of the WGL is to permit the CO to 
develop a prenegotiation profit objective based on Performance 
Risk, Contract-type Risk, and Facilities Capital Employed. 
Used properly, there should be no bias towards a company 
simply because that company is highly facilitized. 
G.   USE OF WEIGHTED GUIDELINES BY INDUSTRY 
As discussed above, the WGL focus on three primary 
factors: Performance Risk, Contract-type Risk, and Facilities 
Capital Employed. The research indicates that there are many 
other factors which influence industry's definition of a 
reasonable profit. Though encouraged to utilize the WGL to 
develop their own prenegotiation profit objectives, industry 
appears to find the WGL too narrow to properly address their 
concerns. Only 42.1% of the respondents indicated use of the 
WGL to prepare for negotiations with the Government. This is 
surprising, considering a 1989 study which noted that all 23 
defense contractors surveyed used WGL "as a tool to 
substantiate  or  confirm their profit/fee  objectives  on 
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negotiated contracts". [Ref 4:p.35] Of course, in 1989 the 
current WGL approach was relatively new, having been 
implemented in August 1987. The 23 contractors cited in the 
1989 study may have been testing the new WGL in order to 
determine its value to the negotiation process. The fact that 
only 42.1% of respondents in the instant research use the WGL 
leads the researcher to conclude that industry has determined, 
after the "test period", that the WGL have insufficient value 
to merit continued use of the method. 
Of the 42.1% of respondents who use the WGL, 75% 
identified themselves as prime contractors. This is to be 
expected, since fewer subcontractors are in a position to have 
contracted directly with the Government. Additionally, the 
likelihood of a respondent using the WGL to prepare for 
negotiations with the Government increased as the firm's 
degree of sole source work increased. The majority of those 
using WGL, 62.5%, perform greater than 25% sole source work, 
with 43.75% falling between 25 and 50% sole source business. 
This is also expected, due to the requirements for cost 
analysis under most sole source contracts. 
Of those respondents who use the WGL, many cited a desire 
to establish a common frame of reference for entering 
negotiations.  Typical responses show this: 
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This  helps  us  understand  the  Government's 
position although we might not agree. 
...helps understand customer's position. 
We use the approach to establish our basis for 
discussing our proposed profit objectives. 
Only to independently assess the Government's use 
of the method. 
Additionally, respondents indicated a desire to improve 
understanding of the Government's calculations, and ensure 
readiness to discuss the situation. Interestingly, no 
respondent suggested that their use of the WGL improved the 
negotiation process, or led to negotiation of a higher profit 
rate. It seems obvious though, that a common frame of 
reference between both parties would benefit the discussions. 
Those respondents who do not use the WGL to prepare for 
negotiations with the Government indicated that the method was 
not relevant and did not provide any value-added to the 
negotiation process. These comments support the researcher's 
opinion that many contractors believe use of the WGL to be of 
little or no benefit. These firms believe that the numerous 
other factors affecting prenegotiation profit objective 
render the WGL virtually useless. Also, as one contractor 
noted, "The Government shares their own calculations; no 
advantage in having our own". Some of the factors affecting 
industry profit objective, as cited by respondents, include: 
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• 
Our firm's profit objectives are a function of 
corporate profit goals. Most WGL calculations 
fall below these goals. 
Profit objectives... are set by management to meet 
shareholder return objectives. 
Based on commercial profits. WGL too 
limiting/myopic. 
Our profit objective is based on risk and 
investment. 
Management discretion based on cost of capital, 
unallowables and required rates of return. 
All of these factors, and others listed in Chapter IV, affect 
the profit rate that industry requires and expects. 
It seems clear that contractors will enter negotiations 
with their own predetermined profit objective, whether they 
use the WGL or not. In fact, 71% of the respondents agreed 
that specific contractors are out for a specific return on 
each contract, regardless of the WGL. The primary decision 
factor for use of the WGL was the desire, or lack thereof, to 
have a common reference point for discussions with the 
Government. This may lead to an unwillingness on the part of 
some contractors to be flexible in the negotiation of profit. 
If the WGL provide a profit objective which falls below the 
company's goals, the company obviously gains little by making 
this known during negotiations. It is easier for a firm to 
ignore the guidelines and blame any differences on the use of 
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the approach by the Government, rather than to admit the 
possibility that its own internal profit goals are 
unrealistic. Some firms may not have the flexibility to 
negotiate profit levels below certain goals. If the profit 
available from DoD contracts is not adequate, firms always 
have the option of withdrawing from the marketplace. None of 
the respondents said that WGL calculations are inherently 
wrong; the firms only said they use other means to determine 
profit objectives. It is possible, of course, that due to 
economic and competitive pressures, firms may not be willing 
or able to devote personnel or resources to WGL calculations. 
But, if the firms do not use WGL, the credibility of their 
arguments could be questioned. 
Results of the research also show that very few of the 
respondents, just 18.4%, use the WGL to prepare for 
negotiations with other contractors. Most respondents 
indicated that the WGL method provides very little "value- 
added" to the process of negotiation with other contractors. 
Representative comments include: 
Normally other contractors do not use WGL. We 
use WGL when the prime is familiar with it and 
they use it. 
Not relevant. 
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• Serves no purpose. 
• Non-negotiable. 
Many respondents cited the same considerations as those who do 
not use WGL to prepare for negotiations with the Government, 
but these contractors also mentioned a preference for 
negotiation of profit based on industry standards, risk, level 
of investment, and the judgment of individual negotiators. 
All of these considerations are perfectly reasonable. If few 
firms utilize the WGL within industry, it is not a surprise 
that companies do not spend the time and money to use the 
approach. In today's commercial environment, few firms can 
successfully compete by spending resources on functions 
perceived to be of no value. 
H.   SUBJECTIVITY 
Many respondents indicated a belief that DoD contracting 
officers were subjective in the use of the Weighted 
Guidelines.  Representative comments include the following: 
• WGL...is based on a very subjective evaluation of 
each factor. 
• ...too much is left to interpretation. 
• Highly interpretive, subjective. 
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•     Obviously, there is a great deal of subjectivity 
in the application of the factors. 
Is this a fair criticism? There is nothing in the DFARS that 
requires a CO to be objective. In fact, it can be argued that 
subjectivity is required. The CO must assign values based on- 
his best judgment under the circumstances. Should he choose 
to assign an above or below normal value, he must justify this 
position. It is possible the respondents concerned about this 
issue are confusing subjectivity with a lack of fairness. The 
CO should, of course, be fair and unbiased when selecting WGL 
values. As long as use of the WGL by the Government depends 
on personal judgment of contracting personnel, this will be a 
concern for contractors. However, this may not be as large a 
concern as it appears. Only 21% of the respondents mentioned 
the issue of subjectivity in their narrative comments. These 
comments were divided evenly between prime contractors and 
subcontractors: 22.2% of subs and 20.7% of primes mentioned 
subjectivity. If the issue was in fact of great concern to 
the respondents, the researcher would have expected more to 
mention it. It is entirely possible that the respondents 
could have encountered instances where, in their opinion, the 
CO's use of the WGL was indeed arbitrary.  Of those firms who 
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did mention subjectivity, none provided specific examples to 
support their contention. 
I.   GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL 
Obviously, the proper use of the WGL depends heavily on 
the knowledge and training of the contracting officers 
utilizing the method. Unfortunately, based on the results of 
this research, many in the defense industry believe the 
training, knowledge and experience of Government contracting 
personnel is lacking: 
Only 28.9% of respondents indicated a belief that 
DoD contracting officers have a good 
understanding of how to interpret and apply the 
WGL. 
The majority, 57.9%, indicated frequent 
differences with the CO's use of the WGL and DD 
Form 1547. 
In addition, numerous comments were made regarding Government 
personnel.  These include: 
Provide better  training to  Government buyers 
using [the WGL]. 
Top  level  policy:good  -  implementation  and 
understanding by typical GS-11 or GS-12:poor. 
Most PCOs do not understand business and the 
profit motive. 
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•     COs,  in my experience,  do not have  a good 
understanding of profit. 
The fact that industry frequently disagrees with the 
contracting officer's use of the WGL does not necessarily mean 
that Government contracting officers do not know how to use 
the guidelines. It is expected that industry representatives 
would desire the highest possible profit; if the CO determines 
an objective below the expectation, there will be 
disagreement. Industry's perception is supported by the 
findings of a report issued by the Department of Defense, 
Office of the Inspector General (DODIG) on 28 December 1990. 
In this audit report, based on a review of 150 randomly 
selected DD Forms 1547 amounting to $2.3 billion, DODIG noted 
that: 
...DoD contracting officers did not adequately 
document profit objectives and did not correctly 
prepare DD Forms 1547, Record of Weighted 
Guidelines Application, used to develop profit 
objectives. These conditions existed because of 
inadequate training procedures for the 
documentation and development of DD Form 1547 
profit objectives, and because of inadequate 
supervisory reviews. [Ref 21:p.5] 
However,  DoD did not agree with these  findings;  while 
admitting some mathematical errors were made, DoD argued that 
101 
the DODIG's conclusions were based on a lack of understanding 
by that agency of DFARS guidance.  [Ref 21:p.24] 
Many respondents perceive that Government personnel do 
not understand the profit motive; however, no respondents 
provided examples of how any alleged lack of understanding of 
profit on the part of the CO proved a detriment to the 
negotiation of a fair profit. It must be remembered that the 
WGL provides a prenegotiation profit objective. The CO can 
use this objective as a starting point during negotiations. 
The figure provided by the WGL is only a guideline. However, 
the results of the survey indicate that COs may be unwilling 
to negotiate a profit higher than the objective obtained from 
the WGL. Such a stance by the CO is appropriate if, in his 
best judgment, a higher profit rate is not justified. But, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the DoD organizational 
culture must permit an environment in which the CO can 
negotiate profit rates higher than those generated by the WGL, 
if conditions warrant. DoD does not expect all of its 
contracting personnel to possess MBA degrees; if the WGL are 
used properly and supplemented by the CO's judgment, an 
understanding of the "profit motive" is not really reguired. 
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J.   THE WEIGHTED GUIDELINES AND CONTRACT TYPE 
The researcher attempted to determine the extent of 
industry opinion regarding the effectiveness of the WGL on 
various contract types. The results can be summarized as 
follows: 
Only 10.5% of respondents indicated the WGL are 




Some 23.7% of respondents indicated the WGL are 
more effective when negotiating cost- 
reimbursement contracts. 
An additional 23.7% of respondents indicated that 
the WGL are equally effective under both contract 
types. 
Surprisingly, 42.1% did not answer this question. 
The researcher expected a significant number of responses 
indicating the WGL to be more effective under cost- 
reimbursement contracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts are 
negotiated for work which is riskier than that performed under 
fixed-price contracts. It would seem that the negotiation of 
profit would be more important for riskier business. While 
twice as many respondents favored the use of WGL for cost 
contracts over fixed-price contracts, the overall numbers were 
lower than expected. The researcher concluded that, due to 
the high number of respondents who failed to answer this 
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question, it is likely that many of the respondents believe 
the WGL is not effective under any contract type. This is 
only a supposition on the part of the researcher, but few 
other conclusions can be drawn from these data. 
K.    INDUSTRIAL BASE CONSIDERATIONS 
The FAR states that it is in the Government's best 
interests to use profit policy to "...maintain a viable 
industrial base". [Ref 6:p.15-37] However, the perception 
among respondents is that this goal is not being met. The 
vast majority of those responding, 78.9%, indicated a belief 
that the WGL, as a vehicle for implementation of DoD profit 
policy, do not provide sufficient incentive for firms to 
remain active members of the defense industrial base. None of 
the respondents believe the WGL do provide such an incentive. 
Few of the respondents commented on this issue directly, but 
some comments do relate.  These include: 
• DoD needs to incentivize the industrial base to 
perform defense work, not avoid it due to 
unacceptable returns. 
• If a company can't make at least 10-15% profit on 
routine orders, it will not be able to stay in 
business. 
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In an era of declining defense budgets, it is clear 
that DoD cannot support the industrial base as it existed in 
the late 1980s, when the current profit policy was 
implemented. Defense firms will continue to exit the market 
or merge in order to survive. Some firms will go out of 
business. According to Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology,: 
...the supplier base has already been reduced from 
approximately 120,000 to 30,000 firms, and the base 
is likely to shrink by another one-third before the 
defense drawdown is completed.  [Ref 13:p.36] 
DoD appears quite content to let these changes occur; in 
reality, DoD can probably do little to slow the process, even 
with the current Congress' plan to spend more on defense. 
The fact that the defense budget is declining does not 
mean that the WGL are flawed. If COs are using the guidelines 
properly, developing profit objectives based on the details of 
each contract, and using sound judgment to negotiate profit, 
contractors will have little room to complain. It is probable 
that the respondents are blaming profit policy for the 
problems associated with declining defense dollars. As 
discussed in this chapter's section on risk and return, .many 
respondents feel that the WGL do not provide sufficient return 
on investment; this factor alone could cause firms to exit the 
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defense market. DoD cannot support the current industrial 
base, regardless of profit policy. In the current 
environment, profit policy alone can have little impact on the 
viability of the industrial base. However, as mentioned 
above, a viable base must be maintained. 
L.   RESPONDENT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
A wide range of opinions was elicited on the subject of 
improving the WGL. Most responses were of a very general 
nature, providing few details. The results can, for the most 
part, be grouped into four areas: more recognition of risk and 
investment, less subjectivity, more use of business judgment 
by Government personnel, and elimination of the WGL 
altogether. Other comments recommended improved training for 
Government personnel, simplified completion of DD Form 1547, 
and reduction of bureaucracy. Most of these subject areas 
have been addressed in detail above. 
A large number of respondents favored total elimination 
of the WGL even though no firm reasons were provided to 
support this recommendation. Most indicated a desire to 
negotiate profit, but few acknowledge that this is what occurs 
under the current system. The WGL provides a profit objective 
which is a guideline for the CO; he can then negotiate the 
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actual profit rate. It is probable that many firms feel the 
CO could be more easily "manipulated" to a higher'profit level 
without the WGL as a guide. The frequent comments regarding 
subjectivity, COs' fear of criticism, and failure of WGL to 
properly recognize risk provide a clearer picture of .industry 
perspective. Defense firms, based on the results of this 
research, hold the perception that DoD profit policy, 
specifically the Weighted Guidelines, is not a fair and 
effective means of establishing profit objective. 
Why then, do firms continue to compete for defense 
business? It must be remembered, as discussed in Chapter II, 
many factors other than profit affect a company's decisions. 
The desire for increased market share, improved public image, 
benefits to commercial business, and opportunities for follow- 
on contracts will all affect corporate behavior. Firms, in 
the short run, may be willing to accept lower than desired 
profits if they believe they will benefit in the long run. 
Thus, the perception that DoD profit policy is not fair and 
effective may not be sufficient to dissuade firms from 
competing for DoD work. 
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M.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the data 
presented in Chapter IV. The analysis can be summarized as 
follows: 
In general, respondents have a negative opinion 
of the WGL. 
The WGL do not adequately recognize risk, nor 
provide adequate return on investment. 
DoD's organizational culture inhibits negotiation 
of fair profits. 
Few firms use the WGL to prepare for negotiations 
with either the Government or other firms. 
The WGL provide little or no incentive for firms 
to remain in the defense marketplace. 
The next chapter will provide the researcher's conclusions 
and recommendations, summarize all research questions and 
identify areas for further study. 
lOi 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions 
and recommendations derived from the research, answer the 
primary and subsidiary research questions, and suggest areas 
of further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions are a sequence of analytically drawn 
findings based on the research conducted into DoD profit 
policy, specifically the Weighted Guidelines method of 
establishing profit objective. The conclusion will be cited 
first, followed by a justification of that conclusion. 
1. Conclusion #1 
The majority o f defense contract ors feel the Wei ghted 
Guidelines are not a fair and effective means of establi shing 
profit objectives. 
Based on the results of the research, contractors feel 
that the Weighted Guidelines are inflexible, subjective, 
potentially biased toward large firms, and should be 
eliminated.  The policy is seen as cheap, out of date, and 
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lacking in recognition of basic business realities such as 
risk and return on investment. Clearly, in the opinion of 
industry, the policy as it currently exists is not satisfying 
the FAR goal of providing contractors with "sufficient 
financial rewards". 
2. Conclusion #2 
The Weight 3d Guidelines do not properly rewarc i def ense 
cont ract ors for risk- -taking and capi tal investment, nor does 
the pol icy provi de contractors  a reasonable  return on 
investment. 
The research shows that most defense contractors feel the 
Government does not properly recognize, nor emphasize, 
contractor risk. In the opinion of the contractors, risk 
should be the most significant aspect of the WGL; they feel 
the current WGL values available for assignment under 
Performance Risk and Contract-type risk are inadequate. 
Additionally, industry believes that DoD is unrealistic in 
determining reasonable rates of return. The WGL are designed 
to promote capital investment, yet the research shows that the 
WGL do not motivate industry to invest, nor reward investment 
when it occurs. 
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3. Conclusion #3 
The organizational culture within the DoD acquisition 
community encourages contracting personnel to utilize the 
Weighted Guidelines in a manner so as to minimize contractor 
profit and avoid criticism and oversight. 
The research shows that, in the opinion of the defense 
industry, DoD contracting officers attempt to minimize 
contract price, including profit, in order to avoid criticism 
from superiors, and prevent additional oversight. This 
culture disregards the motivational role of profit, and 
partially explains the alleged lack of adequate recognition of 
contractor risk as discussed above. Additionally this 
attitude , if it exists, contradicts FAR guidance to properly 
recognize the function of profit. 
4. Conclusion #4 
The majority of defense contractors believe the Weighted 
Guidelines add no value to the process of preparing for 
negotiations with the Government and other contractors. 
The research shows that many factors affect the profit 
objectives determined by industry. These include corporate 
profit goals, shareholder return objectives, cost of capital, 
risk and return.  In the opinion of defense contractors, the 
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WGL are too limiting and narrow to ' properly address these 
concerns. Additionally, the large majority of contractors 
develop specific profit objectives regardless of WGL 
calculations. Though encouraged to use the WGL to prepare for 
negotiations, many contractors do not find the process useful 
Those contractors who did utilize the WGL cited a desire 
to establish a common reference point for discussions with the 
Government. These contractors still develop their own profit 
objectives based on the factors discussed above. Few 
contractors use the WGL to prepare for negotiations with other 
contractors. Reasons cited for this include a lack of 
relevance and lack of use of the WGL within industry. 
Clearly, if industry believed the WGL were a useful tool in 
the calculation of profit objectives, it would be used. 
5. Conclusion #5 
The majority of defense contractors believe: (1) DoD 
contracting officers do not understand use and interpretation 
of the Weighted Guidelines; and (2) DoD contracting officers 
do not have an understanding of business and the profit 
motive. 
The research shows that defense contractors believe the 
training,  knowledge and experience of DoD personnel  is 
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lacking. The industry responses show a low level of 
confidence in the ability of contracting officers to properly 
use the WGL to determine a fair profit objective, primarily 
due to a lack of understanding by DoD personnel of the 
business world. 
6. Conclusion #6 
DoD profit policy does not provide an incentive for 
contractors to remain active members of the defense industrial 
base. 
The research shows that the current profit policy and the 
WGL do not provide adequate incentive for contractors to 
remain in the defense marketplace. There are many factors 
contributing to the shrinking defense industrial base, 
including decreased defense spending. In this environment, 
profit policy alone cannot ensure the maintenance of a viable 
industrial base. Contractors require an adequate return on 
investment, and if it is not provided by DoD contracts, firms 
will exit the marketplace or go out of business. 
C.   RE COMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are provided as a result of 
this study: 
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1. Recommendation #1 
A new profit study should be conducted to evaluate DoD 
profit policy and the Weighted Guidelines in light of the 
significant changes in the acquisition environment. 
The last major profit study, DFAIR, was conducted ten 
years ago; the current WGL method was implemented over eight 
years ago. The world has changed dramatically in that time. 
The Soviet Union no longer exists, the threats to U.S. 
national security are unpredictable, and the roles and 
missions of the U.S. armed forces are in a period of change. 
The defense acquisition environment has changed also. The 
defense budget has decreased, the industrial base is 
shrinking, acquisition reform and streamlining continues to 
occupy congressional attention, and the "information 
superhighway" has changed the face of global competition. 
When 89.5% of survey respondents believe the WGL should be 
modified, replaced, or eliminated, a review is required. A 
new, comprehensive study is needed to determine if the goals 
and assumptions underlying the current WGL remain valid. 
Any new study should include an arrangement teaming DoD 
and industry personnel. Industry personnel can bring insight 
on risk, return and sound business judgment to a review of DoD 
profit policy.   DoD and industry must be partners in this 
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effort, if a new policy is to protect the interests of the 
taxpayer while properly motivating contractor performance and 
gaining credibility within the contractor community. 
2. Recommendation #2 
DoD must ensure that contracting officers are thoroughly 
trained in the use and application of the Weighted Guidelines. 
It is in the best interests of DoD to ensure that 
contracting officers are properly trained in use and 
application of the WGL. As noted in this research, defense 
contractors believe that a lack of understanding of business 
and the profit motive prevents DoD contracting officers from 
determining reasonable profit objectives. DoD contracting 
officers may never have the same grasp of "business" as 
industry does; few DoD COs have worked in private industry. 
However, DoD can seek new employees with business experience, 
and provide opportunities for business-related education for 
current contracting personnel. In addition, if a new profit 
study is conducted as recommended above, a new WGL policy may 
compensate for any actual or perceived lack of business 
knowledge among contracting officers. The guidelines 
themselves will incorporate the business perspective.  All 
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that would remain is the application of good judgment by the 
CO. 
3 . Recommendation #3 
DoD contracting officers must be empowered and provided 
sufficient flexibility to determine reasonable profit 
objectives in accordance with the Statement of Guiding 
Principles for the Federal Acquisition System. 
A frequent complaint cited by survey respondents was a 
organizational culture within DoD that encourages contracting 
officers to negotiate profit in such a manner so as to avoid 
criticism and oversight. The Guiding Principles encourage 
acquisition personnel to "exercise personal initiative and 
sound business judgment". While the Principles require 
responsibility and accountability for wise use of public 
resources, they also mandate empowerment, with decision-making 
and accountability at the lowest possible level. This culture 
change must be embraced throughout the acquisition system, by 
supervisory as well as contracting personnel. Contracting 
officers must feel empowered to use their judgment to make the 
best possible profit decision, even if that means negotiating 
a higher profit rate than that derived from the WGL.  The WGL 
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are a tool; they should not be a crutch for the CO to justify 
his position. 
4. Recommendation #4 
DoD should continue to encourage contractors to uti lize 
the Weighted Gui delines to prepare for negotiations with the 
Government and other contractors, while ensurin g that 
contractors understand and are indoct rinated in use of the 
Weighted Guidelines. 
The research shows that many contractors find the WGL 
irrelevant and without purpose. DoD should make every attempt 
to ensure that all defense contractors and subcontractors 
understand the WGL and the reasoning behind its use. If a new 
profit study is conducted, taking into account an industry 
perspective, contractors may be more willing to accept the WGL 
as a tool. DoD should also be completely open with 
contractors, sharing WGL calculations and the reasoning behind 
profit objective determinations. This will help remove some 
of the perceived subjectivity and bias in the WGL. In order 
for industry to expend the time, effort, and money to use the 
WGL, the guidelines must be useful and relevant. 
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D.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Answers to the research questions posed in Chapter I are 
provided below. 
1. Primary Research Question 
To what extent does DoD's current profit policy, 
specifically the Weighted Guidelines method of determining 
profit objective, incentivize defense contractors to provide 
the most efficient and effective contract performance? 
Obviously, defense firms have an incentive to compete for 
DoD business; otherwise, none would perform defense work. 
However, the research has shown that, to the majority of 
defense contractors, DoD profit policy and the WGL are not an 
incentive to provide efficient and effective contract 
performance. Commercial firms take many factors into 
consideration when performing defense work and developing 
internal profit objectives. The level of incentive provided 
by these factors, including profit, is difficult to quantify. 
Regardless, it is clear that DoD profit policy and the WGL 
alone are, in the opinion of defense contractors, not 
providing sufficient financial rewards. 
Hi 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
How does the defense industry view the effectiveness of 
DoD profit policy? 
In industry's view, DoD profit policy is out of date, 
irrelevant and inflexible. The majority do not feel that the 
current WGL are fair and effective. Contractors believe the 
policy does not properly reward risk and investment, does not 
provide sufficient return, and seeks to minimize contractor 
profit to the maximum extent possible. 
Do defense contractors use the Weighted Guidelines method 
to prepare for negotiations?  If not, why not? 
The majority of defense contractors do not use the WGL to 
prepare for negotiations. Those who do use the WGL wish to 
establish a common frame of reference for discussions. Those 
contractors who do not use the method feel it adds little of 
value to the negotiation process. 
es 
In an era of declinin g defense budgets, to what extent 
do DoD' s prof it policy provide an incentive to cont ractors 
to remain an ac tive member o f the de fense indust rial base? 
The vast majority of contractors feel the WGL provide 
little or no incentive to remain in the defense marketplace. 
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The shrinking defense budget plays a role in firms exiting the 
market; there is simply not enough funding available to 
maintain the industrial base as it existed when the current 
WGL were developed. Those firms attempting to remain 
competitive for defense contracts believe the WGL are not 
designed nor used to maintain a viable industrial base. 
E.   SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A study of statistical profit information in the defense 
industry should be conducted to compare profits earned from 
defense contracts with commercial contracts. The same study 
could examine prenegotiation profit objectives for both 
Government and industry, and analyze the actual profit rates 
negotiated. In this research, many comments were made 
regarding the WGL; statistical analysis could determine if 
these opinions are accurate. 
Another interesting and useful study could provide a 
detailed analysis of all the factors which influence contract 
performance, 'including a review of the role of profit as an 
incentive. The Government presumes profit to be the primary 
motivator for industry. This study could determine if this is 
a valid assumption. 
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APPENDIX A.  QUESTIONNAIRE 




LT James P. Davis 
Naval Postgraduate School 
2.University Cir SGC 2657 
Monterey, CA 93943-2657 
Dear 
My name is Lieutenant Jim Davis. I am a U.S. Navy Supply 
Corps officer working on a Master's degree in acquisition and 
contracting at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. As part of my degree requirements, I am preparing 
a thesis on the effectiveness of the current profit policy of 
the Department of Defense. The focus of my research is the 
use and effectiveness of the Weighted Guidelines method of 
determining profit (or fee) objective. Specifically, I am 
interested in your perspective as a member of the defense 
industry. To this end, I have enclosed a short survey 
designed to take 10 to 15 minutes to complete. It would be a 
great help if you could complete the survey and return it to 
me. For your convenience, I have enclosed a self-addressed 
stamped envelope. If you are unfamiliar with the Weighted 
Guidelines, please complete the first seven questions and the 
optional information at the end of the survey. If at all 
possible, I would ask you to return the completed survey no 
later than 04 September 1995. 
Your responses to my survey will be totally confidential. 
I am the only person who will see the completed surveys, and 
they will be destroyed upon the completion of my research. No 
names of companies or individuals will appear in the thesis. 
Additionally, my research and the questions included in the 
survey do not necessarily represent the views of the 
Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
If you have questions or comments regarding my research, 
please feel free to write me at the above address or contact 
me via my voice mail, (408) 656-2536/2537, extension 2657. 
Additional information can also be sent to me via Fax at (408) 
656-2138. Please ensure any faxes are clearly addressed to LT 
Jim Davis, section MR44. I can also receive comments or 
responses via E-mail.  My address is jpdavis@nps.navy.mil. 
I want to thank you in advance for your assistance. The 
information you provide will be invaluable. 
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1. Your firm is primarily a: 34  prime contractor      11 
subcontractor 
2. Amount of annual business with DoD: (check one) 
A. Under $100,000   2 E. 5,000,001 - 10,000,000 6  
B. 100,000 - 500,000^2  F. 10,000,001 - 50, 000,000 10 C. 
500,001 - 1,000,000_0  G. 50,000,001 - 100,000,000 5  D. 
1,000,001 - 5,000,000  6_ H. Over 100,000,000 14 
3. Number of employees: (check one) 
A. Under 50  4_ E. 1,001 - 5,000 _9  
B. 50 - 100  6_ F. 5,001 - 10,000   3 
C. 101 - 500  11 G. Over 10,000  7_ 
D. 501 - 1,000  5 
4. Your primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code, 
if known: See App. B 
5. Percentage  of  your  work which  is  sole  source/non- 
competitive: (check one) 
A. Under 10% 12 C. 26 - 50% 11 
B. 10 - 25%    9 D. Over 50% 11 
What is your primary product or service?  See App. B 
7. Are you familiar with DoD's Weighted Guidelines and the use 
of DD Form 1547? (a copy of the 1547 is attached for 
reference) Yes 38      No   7 
8. Does your firm use the Weighted Guidelines, including DD 
Form 1547, to prepare for negotiations with the Government? 
Yes  16     No 22 
If yes, how does your use of the Weighted Guidelines affect 
the negotiation process? 
If not,  why not?  How does  your  firm establish profit 
obj ective? 
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9. Does your firm use the Weighted Guidelines, including DD 
Form 1547, to prepare for negotiations with other contractors? 
Yes   7      No   29 
If not, why not? 
10. Do you believe the Weighted Guidelines approach favors any 
particular set of contractors?    Yes 13       No 15 
If yes, please explain. 
11. Do you believe the Weighted Guidelines approach is more 
effective when used to negotiate: (check one) 
A. Fixed-price contracts 4        C. Equally effective in 
both cases   9 
B. Cost-reimbursement contracts   9 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of 
the following statements. Use the below scale and record your 
answer in the space provided. 
1 2 3 
agree neutral       disagree 
12. 2.09 DoD contracting officers have a good understanding 
of how to interpret and apply the Weighted Guidelines. 
13. 2.33 Contractor capital investment is fairly rewarded 
under the Weighted Guidelines approach. 
14. 2.45 The current Weighted Guidelines approach is 
sufficiently flexible to provide adequate profits to the 
majority of contractors. 
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15. 1.79 Negotiated contractor profits would be higher if 
DoD did not use the Weighted Guidelines. 
16. 2.58 The range of values available for assignment by DoD 
contracting officers provides adequate recognition of a 
contractor's performance risk. 
17. 1.45 I frequently have significant differences with the 
contracting officer's use of the Weighted Guidelines and DD 
Form 1547. 
18. 2.18 The use and application of the DD Form 1547 is 
clear and understandable. 
19. 2.39 The range of values available for assignment by the 
contracting officer provides adequate recognition of the risk 
to the contractor associated with various contract types. 
20. 2.73 The Weighted Guidelines factors for facilities 
capital employed are sufficient to encourage capital 
investment. 
21. 2.91 The Weighted Guidelines, as a vehicle for 
implementation of DoD's profit policy, provide sufficient 
incentive for contractors to remain active members of the 
defense industrial base. 
22. 1.33 The Weighted Guidelines are used more as a crutch 
to justify the final negotiated price than as a tool to 
develop an appropriate profit objective. 
23. 1.24 Regardless of the Weighted Guidelines, specific 
contractors are out for a specific return on each contract. 
24. 2.45 The Weighted Guidelines approach is a fair and 
effective means of establishing profit objective. 
25. Do you feel the Weighted Guidelines approach should be: 
(check one) 
A. Retained as is   0 C. Replaced   3 ■ 
B. Modified   10 D. Eliminated  21 
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26. What recommendations, if any, would you make to improve 
the Weighted Guidelines? 
27. How would you characterize DoD's profit policy, including 
the Weighted Guidelines and the DD Form 1547? (If desired, 
feel free to write directly on the attached copy of the 
1547) . 
Please provide additional comments in the space provided 
below. For specific comments, indicate question number. Feel 
free to write on the reverse of this page or attach additional 
pages, if desired. 
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28. Are you willing to discuss your views by: 
A. Phone Yes      No  
B. Personal interview   Yes No 
29. (Optional) If you answered "yes" to question #28, please 






APPENDIX B.  PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
Standard  Industrial  Classification  Codes  and Respondent 
Product/Service listing. 
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Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes provided by 
respondents: 
2892 Explosives 
3410 Metal Cans 
3479 Coating, Engraving and Allied Services 
34 8 4 Small Arms 
3519 Internal Combustion Engines 
3731 Ship Building and Repair 
3764 Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Propulsion Units 
3812 Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance Equipment 
5190 Miscellaneous Nondurable Goods 
7699 Repair Shops and Related Services 
8711 Engineering Services 
8731 Commercial Physical and Biological Research 
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Respondent Products and Services (alphabetical order) 
Aerospace and Automotive Engines 
Aerospace Products 










Electronics and Electro-Optics 
Electronics and Mechanical Manufacturing 
Electronic Test Equipment 
Engines and Engine Components 
Engineering Services 
Electronic Warfare 
Fabricated Explosive Products 
Fleet Ballistic Missile Launchers 
Helicopter Manufacturing 
Helicopter Research and Development 
High Power Amplifiers 
Inertial Navigation Computers 
Infrared Imaging Cameras 
Marine Machinery 
Mechanical Assemblies 
Military High Explosives 
Munition Containers 
Navigation/Guidance Equipment 
Ordnance-Rocket Missile Parts 
Parachute Recovery Systems 
Radar Systems 




Ship Construction and Repair 
Small Arms 
Special Operations Small Arms 
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